Justice reasoning and responsibility reasoning in relation to commitment and happiness in long-term marriages by Goodwin, Ellen Pemberton & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
INFORMATION TO USERS 
The most advanced technology has been used to photo­
graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm 
master. UMI films the original text directly from the copy 
submitted. Thus, some dissertation copies are in typewriter 
face, while others may be from a computer printer. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a 
complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will 
be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyrighted material had to 
be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re­
produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper 
left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal 
sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is available 
as one exposure on a standard 35 mm slide or as a 17" x 23" 
black and white photographic print for an additional charge. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been 
reproduced xerographically in this copy. 35 mm slides or 
6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for 
any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for 
an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. 
•UMI 
Accessing the World's Information since 1938 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 

Order Number 8822401 
Justice reasoning and responsibility reasoning in relation to 
commitment and happiness in long-term marriages 
Goodwin, Ellen Pemberton, Ph.D. 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1988 
Copyright ©1988 by Goodwin, Ellen Pemberton. All rights reserved. 
U M I  
300 N. Zeeb Rd. 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 

PLEASE NOTE: 
In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy. 
Problems encountered with this document have been identified here with a check mark V . 
1. Glossy photographs or pages 
2. Colored illustrations, paper or print 
3. Photographs with dark background 
4. Illustrations are poor copy 
5. Pages with black marks, not original copy 
6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides of page 
7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages ^ 
8. Print exceeds margin requirements 
9. Tightly bound copy with print lost in spine 
10. Computer printout pages with indistinct print 
11. Page(s) lacking when material received, and not available from school or 
author. 
12. Page(s) seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows. 
13. Two pages numbered . Text follows. 
14. Curling and wrinkled pages 
15. Dissertation contains pages with print at a slant, filmed as received 
16. Other 

JUSTICE REASONING AND RESPONSIBILITY REASONING 
IN RELATION TO COMMITMENT AND HAPPINESS 
IN LONG-TERM MARRIAGES 
by 
Ellen Pemberton Goodwin 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
the Faculty of the Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Greensboro 
1988 
Approved by 
Dissertation Adviser 
APPROVAL PAGE 
This dissertation has been approved by the following 
committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro. 
Dissertation 
Adviser 
Committee Members 
 ̂" '/7 1 /t- <- £ /C. 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
/<£/ 
Date of F<£nal Oral Examination 
ii 
1988, by Ellen Pemberton Goodwin 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to express special thanks and appreciation to ray 
dissertation adviser, Dr. Rebecca M. Smith, Professor in the 
Department of Child Development and Family Relations, who 
spent many hours in consultation and discussion deepening my 
understanding of moral reasoning. Without her questioning 
probes, her insight, and her willingness to support my 
"research hunches," this research project would not have 
come to fruition. She believed in me long before I believed 
in myself. I also want to thank the other members of my 
committee: Dr. William Purkey, Professor in the School of 
Education, Dr. Barbara Clawson, Professor and 
Chair of the Department of Home Economics Education and 
Business, and Dr. Mildred Johnson, Professor in the 
Department of Home Economics Education and Business. Their 
contributions and guidance, both in the classroom and on the 
committee were indispensable. 
I gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the 15 
couples who participated in the research, who, in giving 
their time and patiently struggling with the difficult 
questions, provided the data for this research. I also 
thank the persons who provided me with the names of persons 
to contact for the research. 
iii 
I wish also to acknowledge the contributions of my 
friends and colleagues who nurtured and tolerated me through 
the trying days of formulating a workable research project. 
A special thanks to Barbara Hunt who listened attentively 
and patiently for hours as thoughts and plans germinated 
into this project. 
Deepest gratitude goes to my husband, Joel, who 
supported me and encouraged me through this entire project. 
His commitment and backing were a sustaining force in the 
completion of this study. A special thank you to my four 
children, Joel II, Jim, Chuck, and Mary Katherine, who have 
deepened my understanding of moral reasoning as I have 
watched them grow and develop in their ethical selves to 
become three responsible young men and a young woman. I 
thank them for being who they are. 
iv 
GOODWIN, ELLEN PEMBERTON. Ph.D. Justice Reasoning and 
Responsibility Reasoning in Relation to Commitment and 
Happiness in Long-term Marriages. (1988) Directed by 
Dr. Rebecca M. Smith. 121 pp. 
Marriage, as a microcosm of society, involves the moral 
dilemmas of conflicting rights, competing claims, and 
responsibility for decisions. This study focused on the 
moral development of the individual-in-relationship using 
commitment and happiness as the common ground. The purposes 
of this study were (a) to describe justice reasoning and 
responsibility reasoning of individuals in long-term 
marriages and (b) to assess the relationship of justice and 
responsibility reasoning to commitment and perceived 
happiness. 
Separate in-depth interviews were conducted with 3 0 
individuals in 15 long-term marriages. Data collected were 
responses to three hypothetical dilemmas, four real-life 
dilemmas, and questions on commitment and happiness. 
The findings were that individuals in long-term 
marriages (a) who had similar justice reasoning scores as 
their partner had similar commitment scores and perceived 
happiness scores; (b) who had responsibility reasoning 
scores similar to their partner had dissimilar commitment 
scores; (c) who scored a stage of responsibility reasoning 
similar to their own stage of valuing marriage also 
exhibited similar levels of happiness as their partners; and 
(d) showed no relationship between similarity in moral type 
and responsibility reasoning scores and perceived levels of 
happiness. 
This research in cognitive/developmental theory of 
moral reasoning extends the literature on enduring marriages 
by lending support to the hypotheses that justice reasoning 
stages are associated with both commitment and perceived 
happiness in long-term marriages. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Rarely do individuals go through life apart from other 
people. In fact, the norms of a good life tend to embrace 
intimate relationships with marriage partners, children, 
parents, and significant friends. In the process of 
fashioning these connections, most persons strive for long 
and enduring relationships. Researchers (Blumstein & 
Schwartz, 1983; Cuber & Harroff, 1965; Kegan, 1982; Marks, 
1985) have investigated the characteristics such as 
affective communication, role satisfaction, interpersonal 
resources, conflict resolution, and mutuality of long-term 
marriages in an attempt to discover why these marriages 
endure, and if by enduring, why they are meaningful to the 
persons involved. The question that researchers, 
theoreticians, and clinicians have long asked is this, "What 
are the essential elements of a good long-term 
relationship?" Generally, the people in long-term 
relationships perceive themselves as happy, but it is still 
not clear what factors are associated with this happiness 
and commitment to a long-term marriage. One avenue for 
exploration is in the cognitive/moral realm. 
Marriage, as a microcosm of society, involves the moral 
dilemmas of conflicting rights, competing claims, and 
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responsibility for decisions. Good long-term marriages 
are an arena in which persons have a history of having dealt 
somewhat successfully with these dilemmas. Questions arise 
as to the underlying structures that have allowed those 
persons in long-term relationships to deal competently with 
the numerous conflictual areas that are present. It appears 
that persons behave in a relationship in the way they do 
because of an underlying cognitive thought structure that 
interprets reality in a way that is compatible with their 
belief system. What are those structures, and how do they 
allow for accommodation to the desires and wishes of 
another? The major guestion in this research is this: Does 
similarity in moral reasoning, conceptualized as justice and 
responsibility, encourage persons to maintain commitment to 
marital partners and even allow for perceptions of happiness 
to exist? 
Morality has been the cornerstone of societal living 
since the days of Aristotle and Plato, when justice was 
originally delineated as the first virtue of society that 
"must also be the first virtue of an individual... insofar as 
moral virtues govern relations between a person and other 
persons in a society" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 226). Aristotle 
made a distinction between justice as an "other regarding" 
virtue and the remaining virtues, i.e., gentleness, 
truthfulness, etc., as "not 'other regarding' but rather 
norms of an ideal of the good life for a single rational 
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individual" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 226) . Another aspect of the 
"other regarding" virtue is responsibility for action toward 
others (Higgins, Power, & Kohlberg, 1984). Do the two 
domains of morality, justice as the deontic domain and 
responsibility as the aretaic domain, work concurrently in 
strengthening commitment and encouraging perception of 
happiness? Would justice reasoning and responsibility 
reasoning be related to happiness and commitment of 
individuals in long-term marriages? Secondly, would 
responsibility reasoning and stages of valuing marriage be 
related to perception of happiness? Furthermore, would 
happiness be related to autonomous and heteronomous moral 
types? 
Moral Reasoning 
The study of moral reasoning seems far removed from the 
daily struggles of living in relationships; yet the 
microcosm of family life or marriage is where people live 
out their beliefs in themselves, in others, and in society 
in general. Researchers (Belenky, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; 
Gilligan & Wiggins, 1986; Kegan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1981; 
Murphy & Gilligan, 1980; Roodin, Rybash & Hoyer, 1984) 
attempted to delineate different levels of moral reasoning 
as explanations of why people make certain decisions and 
choices. These structural-developmentalists assume that 
there is a sequential, irreversible, hierarchical 
progression along a continuum from less effective to more 
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effective adult living. They believe that movement along 
the continuum carries with it an increased awareness of the 
moral worth of all human beings and that this awareness 
affects decisions and choices. 
Justice and Responsibility Orientations 
Piaget's (1932/1965) work with cognitive structures and 
the principles of assimilation, accommodation, and 
equilibration has guided the work of the moral reasoning 
developmentalists. He said that cognitive conflict is the 
disequilibrium required to necessitate reorganization or 
development to a qualitatively different level of cognition 
in order to accommodate to new material in the interaction 
between the individual and the environment. Kohlberg (1981) 
accepted Piagets' theoretical framework for development, 
however, he found in his research that moral reasoning 
development has four necessary antecedent conditions for 
movement from one stage to another: (a) cognitive 
development, (b) will and desire to change, (c) number of 
opportunities for social perspective-taking, and (d) belief 
in the centrality of justice. Most researchers have ignored 
the role of real life experiences in moral development 
research preferring to use hypothetical situations instead. 
However, Kohlberg (1984) did stress that 
personal experiences of choice involving questioning 
and commitment... seem (to be) required for movement 
from conventional to principled thought (p. 493) 
even though his research centered on hypothetical 
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situations. 
After assisting Kohlberg with his research, Gilligan 
(1977) conducted research on the real life dilemmas of women 
who were contemplating abortion, "a decision that affects 
both self and others and engages directly the critical moral 
issue of hurting" (p. 491). In response to the findings of 
her research, Gilligan (1977) proposed a Care and 
Responsibility framework for delineating cognitive 
structures in the decision-making realm of dealing with 
real-life experiences. Higgins, Power and Kohlberg (1984) 
acknowledged that Kohlberg"s moral judgments stem from a 
justice orientation, and that "an orientation of care and 
response usefully enlarges the moral domain" (p. 340). 
Furthermore, Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1984a) proposed 
that there is a dimension along which various moral 
dilemmas and orientations can be placed. Personal 
moral dilemmas and orientations of special 
obligations...represent one end of this dimension, and 
the standard hypothetical justice dilemmas and justice 
orientation represent the other end. (p. 232) 
Kohlberg*s studies were done with male subjects, and 
some of the criticisms of his theory (Gilligan, 1982; 
Golding & Laidlaw, 1979-1980; Murphy & Gilligan, 1980) 
question his generalizations to the general population from 
only males' responses. Kohlberg*s research emphasizes that 
males' moral reasoning development is through an ethic of 
rights and rules measured against an ideal of perfection. 
Males, in developing morally, have been socialized to see 
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themselves as apart from others. Because of this, decisions 
are made using rights, fairness, and equity as guidelines. 
Females, on the other hand, seem to have been socialized to 
consider moral decisions with all concerned. Therefore, 
they developed an ethic of Care and Responsibility measured 
against an interconnecting web of relationships. Decisions 
are made using the connection and influence on relationships 
as guidelines (Gilligan, 1982). She found that a 
female's world is a world of relationships and 
psychological truths where an awareness of the 
connection between people gives rise to a recognition 
of responsibility for one another, a perception of the 
need of response...her understanding of morality as 
arising from recognition of relationships, her belief 
in communication as the mode of conflict 
resolution...leads her to see the actors in the dilemma 
arrayed not as opponents in a contest of rights but as 
members of a network of relationships on whose 
continuation they all depend, (p. 30) 
Even though Gilligan claimed a probable gender 
difference in moral orientation, other research does not 
seem to support this contention (Kohlberg, 1984; Pratt & 
Royer, 1982). Kohlberg (1984) counters that revision of his 
scoring method in 1984 eliminated the sex-differences that 
appeared prior to that time. Kohlberg, et al. (1984b), in 
summarizing the findings of the Higgins, et al. (1984) study 
of a moral atmosphere inquiry, said that 
this study suggests that both considerations [justice 
and responsibility] are used by both sexes and that 
preferential orientation is largely a function of the 
type of moral problem defined and of the sociomoral 
atmosphere of the environment in which the dilemma is 
located. Dilemmas located within a "community" or 
"family" context are likely to invoke caring and 
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response considerations, (as) do dilemmas of 
responsibility and caring that go beyond duty....In 
brief, choice of orientation seems to be primarily a 
function of setting and dilemma, not sex. (p. 350) 
Gilligan (1986) augmented this statement by suggesting 
that people understand the logic of both justice and 
care (responsibility) and that these analytically 
distinguishable orientations prompt different ways of 
perceiving conflicts in relationships and promote 
different strategies for attempting to resolve such 
conflicts (p. 12). 
Even though in the research cited, the social setting or the 
dilemma chosen seemed to evoke a justice orientation or a 
responsibility orientation, Roodin, et al (1984) asserted 
that 
the fully functioning, mature adult (man or woman) 
shows a sensitivity for and capacity to deal with both 
dimensions: Justice as equity and justice as personal 
caring. Men as well as women need to integrate both 
rights and responsibility as a condition for attaining 
moral maturity. This integration is attained through 
experience (p. 304-305). 
Experience is recognized by Kohlberg (1981) as 
important. He mentioned adult experiences as antecedents 
for movement into a higher stage of mature morality. 
Roodin, et al (1984) spoke of the influence of "self-
involving life events that are affectively meaningful" (p. 
301) . 
There is a recognition of the influence of affectively 
toned, personally significant life events as 
antecedents to mature morality. Personally significant 
life events are characterized by genuine affect, 
concern and caring for others as well as a sense of 
interpersonal recognition and responsibility. (Roodin, 
et al, 1984, p. 305) 
Murphy and Gilligan's (1980) response would be that 
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while the logic concepts of equality and reciprocity 
can support a principled morality of universal rights 
and respect, experience of moral conflict and choice 
seem to point rather to special obligations and 
responsibilities for consequences that can be 
anticipated and understood only within a more 
contextual frame of reference, (p. 81) 
Therefore, the proposal in the present research 
concerned using long-term marriages as the contextual frame 
of reference. Furthermore, the author proposed that the 
individuals within the marriage behave in the relationship 
in the way they do because of an underlying cognitive 
structure that interprets reality in a way that matches 
their cognitive and affective expressions toward their 
partner. This is probably manifested in happiness and 
commitment. 
Both orientations of morality, justice reasoning and 
responsibility reasoning, were chosen for this research 
since moral development is assumed to be 
fundamentally a process of the restructuring of modes 
of role-taking... (and) the first prerequisite for 
role-taking is participation in a group or institution" 
(Kohlberg, 1984, p. 74). 
Individuals in long-term marriages, by necessity, are 
exposed to multiple opportunities for role-taking, or social 
perception of the other, experienced in an atmosphere of 
caring for the other. Marriage could be considered one of 
the relationships in life that could encourage conditions 
for movement through the stages of moral development. 
Kohlberg, et al (1984a) connected the two orientations when 
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they asserted that "special relationship dilemmas may elicit 
care responses which supplement and deepen the sense of 
generalized obligation of justice" (p. 229). 
Stages of Justice Judgments 
Kohlberg asserted that "there are three kinds (levels) 
of morality that form a developmental order: first, a 
morality of restraint; second, a morality of rules, 
authority and convention; and third, a morality of justice 
and principle" (Turiel, 1983, p. 153). The level (See 
Table 1) labeled preconventional level includes: Stage 1 
(punishment and obedience orientation) and Stage 2 
(instrumental purpose and exchange). The conventional level 
includes: Stage 3 (mutual interpersonal relationships and 
conformity) and Stage 4 (law and order and conscience). The 
third level, called post-conventional morality, is composed 
of Stage 5 (social contract and individual rights) and 
Stage 6 (universal ethical principles). Stage 6 is not 
included in the latest scoring manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 
1988) because of lack of subjects that have moved 
sequentially from stage 5 to stage 6. 
Stages of Responsibility Judgments 
In the Higgins, et al (1984) study of moral atmosphere, 
the authors felt that "deontic judgments of rightness were 
often embedded in judgments of responsibility but that 
judgments of responsibility went beyond deontic judgments" 
(p. 79) in special obligatory relationships. They developed 
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Table 1 
Stages of Justice Reasoning 
LEVEL I. PRECONVENTIONAL MORALITY 
Stage 1. Heteronomous Morality. The perspective is 
that of naive moral realism. Punishment is 
seen as important because it identifies a 
bad action. Moral rules and labels are 
applied in a literal, absolute manner, and 
characteristics of persons of authority and 
power are determined by physical attributes 
or categories. Actions become wrong simply 
because someone labels them wrong. 
Stage 2. Individualistic. Instrumental Morality. The 
perspective at Stage 2 is pragmatic, 
understanding that each person's primary aim 
is to pursue their own interests. The 
assumption that the other is also operating 
from this same perspective leads to an 
emphasis of instrumental exchange, or tit for 
tat. A limitation is that it fails to 
provide a means for deciding for conflicting 
claims. 
LEVEL II CONVENTIONAL MORALITY 
Stage 3. Interpersonallv Normative Morality. This 
perspective coordinates the separate 
perspectives of individuals into a third 
person perspective consisting of mutually 
trusting relationships among people embodying 
a set of shared moral norms. The importance 
of these shared norms requires an emphasis of 
being a good, altruistic or prosocial person 
conforming to the accepted norms. The 
individual is particularly concerned with 
maintaining inter personal trust and social 
approval. 
Stage 4. Social System Morality. At this stage the 
individual takes the perspective of a 
generalized member of society. The pursuit 
of individualistic concerns is valid only 
when it is consistent with maintaining the 
sociomoral system as a whole. The 
perspective taken is generally that of a 
societal, legal, or religious system which 
has been codified into institutionalized laws 
and practice. The perspective may also be 
that of a higher moral law, like one's 
conscience which may conflict with 
Table 1 (Continued) 
institutionalized law. In this case, 
internal conscience is equated with a system 
of divine or natural law. 
LEVEL III POST-CONVENTIONAL MORALITY 
Stage 5: Human Rights and Social Welfare Morality. 
The Stage 5 prior-to-society perspective is 
that of a rational moral agent aware of 
universalizable values and rights that anyone 
would choose to build into a moral society. 
The validity of actual laws and social 
systems can be evaluated in terms of the 
degree to which they preserve and protect 
these fundamental human rights and values. 
This is a society-creating rather than a 
society-maintaining perspective. There is a 
concern for the protection of the rights of 
the minority. Rules and laws are evaluated 
from a long-term consequence perspective in 
relation to groups in society. 
Stage 6. Morality of Universalizable. Reversible, and 
Prescriptive General Ethical Principles. 
The sociomoral perspective of Stage 6 is that 
of "the moral point of view," a point of view 
which ideally all human beings should take 
toward one another as free and equal 
autonomous persons. This means equal 
consideration of the claims or points of view 
of each person affected by the moral decision 
to be made. This includes Rawls's position 
of choosing under "a veil of ignorance," a 
second order application of the Golden Rule 
of "moral musical chairs," an emphasis on 
actual dialogue, and considering preferences 
under the condition of having an equal 
probability of being any of those involved in 
the situation. Multiple principles of 
justice include the principle of maximum 
quality of life for each, maximum liberty 
compatible with the like liberty of others, 
equity or fairness in distribution of goods 
and respect. (Kohlberg, 1984, 621-639) 
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criteria for judging stages of responsibility reasoning (See 
Table 2). Gilligan (1986) proposed that children are 
exposed to both perspectives of morality in their 
experiences of equality-inequality and attachment-
detachment; therefore, most will develop both perspectives 
for resolving dilemmas with one perspective being more 
dominant. 
In an earlier work, Gilligan (1977) proposed a 
framework for organizing a perspective or orientation of 
care and responsibility consisting of five levels, three 
distinct levels and two transitional levels, from the least 
effective in resolving dilemmas to the most effective in 
resolving dilemmas. A brief comparison of Gilligan's (1977) 
framework of care with the responsibility orientation 
suggested by Higgins, et al (1984) follows. (See Table 3 for 
the stages of Responsibility Judgments adapted for marital 
relationships by incorporating Gilligan*s levels). 
Gilligan's Level I (Individual Survival) corresponds 
with Higgins' Stage 1 judgment when responsibility and 
obligation are seen as being the same to ensure one's 
survival by obeying the one (or system) that has power. 
Gilligan's Level I/II (From Selfishness to 
Responsibility) corresponds with Higgins' Stage 2 and Stage 
2/3 when responsibility is differentiated from obligation 
and there is a beginning recognition that everyone is 
responsible for themselves. Connection becomes an issue 
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Table 2 
Criteria for Judgments of Responsibility and Stages of 
Responsibility Judgments 
A. Judgments of responsibility go beyond deontic judgments 
in one of four ways: 
1. Judgments that consider the needs and welfare of 
the other as an individual where the other's 
welfare seems to be a matter of a right or claim 
the other has or where it is a matter of not 
harming the other's welfare is a deontic concern. 
Judgments that consider filling the other's need 
when it is not based on a right or claim or where 
it is a matter of enhancing his or her welfare, not 
just preventing harm, is a responsibility concern. 
2. Judgments of responsibility consciously consider 
the involvement and implication of the self in the 
action or in the welfare consequences to the other. 
3. Judgments of personal moral worth (aretaic) of the 
kind of self the actor wants to be (perfecting 
character) or would be if he or she failed to 
perform the action (judgments of blame, guilt, 
loss of integrity) are judgments of responsibility 
when explicitly used as a basis for action rather 
than rights or obligations. 
4. Judgments that use an intrinsic valuing of social 
relationships such as friendship or relationships 
of community as justification for performing a 
moral action are judgments of responsibility. 
B. Stages of responsibility judgments: 
Stage 1 Responsibility and obligation are seen as being 
the same. The person feels compelled to fulfill 
the commands of superiors or authority figures or 
the rules given by them. 
Stage 2 Responsibility is differentiated from obligation 
from this stage onward. The person is responsible 
only to and for himself or herself and his or her 
welfare, property, and goals. 
Stage 2/3 There is a recognition that everyone is 
responsible to and for themselves, their welfare, 
property, and goals. Persons who are irresponsible 
or careless lose some of the right to have 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
themselves, their welfare, and so on, respected. 
For example, being careless mitigates the right to 
have one's property respected as well as 
justifying a lessened concern for the person's 
welfare. 
Stage 3 Responsibility for the self is to do the "good" 
thing, to live up to generally known and accepted 
standards of a "good person." Responsibility to 
others is limited to those with whom one has a 
personal relationship and is defined as meeting 
their needs or promoting their welfare. 
Stage 3/4 Responsibility is seen more as a process for 
maintaining and enhancing feelings of closeness and 
affection in personal relationships. Being 
irresponsible is defined as "hurting the other's 
feelings" within an a relationship and is 
considered a valid basis for a lessened concern of 
the other's welfare if one's feelings have been 
hurt. 
Stage 4 Responsibility is seen as a mutually binding set 
of feelings and agreements among people in 
relationships, groups, or communities. Being 
responsible for the self means one must act out of 
dependability, trustworthiness, and loyalty 
regardless of the day-to-day fluctuation of 
feelings among people. Irresponsibility on the 
part of those peoples within the same group does 
not mitigate concern for their welfare or rights 
by other group members. 
Note From "The relationship of moral atmosphere to 
judgments of responsibility" by A. Higgins, L. Kohlberg, and 
C. Power, 1984. In W. Kurtine & J. Gewirtz (Eds.), 
Morality. Moral Behavior, and Moral Development, (p. 80), 
New York: John Wiley & Sons. Reprinted with permission. 
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Table 3 
Stages of Responsibility Judgments (Adapted for Marital 
Relationships) 
Responsibility and obligation are seen as being 
the same. The person feels compelled to fulfill 
the commands and rules of the parent figure or 
spouse. External approval dictates behavior. 
Responsibility is differentiated from obligation 
from this stage onward. The person is responsible 
only to and for himself or herself and his or her 
welfare, property, and goals. Persons in marital 
relationships operate from an exchange perspective 
by "doing" for their spouse because their spouse 
"does" for them. 
Stage 2/3 There is a recognition that everyone is 
responsible to and for themselves, their welfare, 
property, and goals. Persons who are 
irresponsible or careless lose some of the right 
to have themselves, their welfare, and so on, 
respected. For example, irresponsibility is 
believed to mitigate the right to have one's 
property respected as well as justifying a 
lessened concern for the person's welfare. 
Connection and attachment begin to become issues 
at this transitional stage and exchange becomes 
less important. 
Stage 3 Responsibility for the self is to do the "good" 
thing, to live up to generally known and accepted 
standards of a "good person." Responsibility to 
others is limited to those with whom one has a 
personal relationship (like a marital 
relationship) and is defined as meeting their 
needs or promoting their welfare. Self-sacrifice 
becomes the norm of goodness, and when 
responsibility conflicts, the self becomes the 
sacrificed victim. 
Stage 3/4 Responsibility is seen more as a process for 
maintaining and enhancing feelings of closeness 
and affection in personal relationships, a 
reconsideration of the relationship between self 
and others. There is an infant awareness of the 
beginning shift from approval of others to an 
inner sense of judgment for what is honest and 
real. Being irresponsible is defined as "hurting 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
the other's feelings" within a relationship and 
is considered a valid basis for a lessened concern 
of the other's welfare if one's feelings have been 
hurt. 
Stage 4 Responsibility is seen as a mutually binding set 
of feelings and agreements among people in 
relationships or marriages. Being responsible for 
the self means one must act out of dependability, 
trustworthiness, and loyalty regardless of the 
day-to-day fluctuation of feelings among people. 
Equity and reciprocity are key ingredients in 
maintaining the relationship. Responsibility 
becomes a self-chosen ethic that enables one to 
reconstruct the dilemma in new terms knowing that 
choices made becomes one's responsibility. A 
transformed understanding of self allows for 
assertion of moral equality between self and 
others. Irresponsibility on the part of a partner 
or group does not mitigate concern for their 
welfare or rights by their spouse. 
Note From "The relationship of moral atmosphere to 
judgments of responsibility" by A. Higgins, L. Kohlberg, and 
C. Power, (1984), in W. Kurtine and J. Gewirtz (Eds.), 
Morality. Moral Behavior, and Moral Development, (p.80). 
New York: John Wiley & Sons. Adapted with permission. 
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with this transition level. 
Gilligan's Level II (Goodness as Self-Sacrifice) 
matches with Higgins' Stage 3 when responsibility for the 
self involves doing the "good" or "right" thing and living 
as others expect one to live. Self-sacrifice becomes the 
norm of goodness, and when responsibilities conflict, the 
self becomes the sacrificed victim. 
Gilliqan's Level II/III (From Goodness to Truth) 
parallels Higgins1 Stage 3/4 when the responsibility is seen 
as a process of maintaining closeness in relationships and 
reconsidering of relationships with acceptance of a 
beginning shift from approval of others to an inner sense of 
judgment for what is honest and real. 
Gilliqan's Level III (The Ethic of Responsibility) 
coincides with Higgins' Stage 4 when responsibility is seen 
as a mutually binding set of feelings and agreements, and a 
transformed understanding of the self allows one to assert a 
moral equality and reciprocity between self and others in an 
atmosphere of love and affection. 
Valuing Marriage 
Being able to arrive at decisions in real-life 
dilemmas, either fictional or actual, involves more than 
just the ethical base of the individual involved. 
In reinterpretating the findings of the Kohlberg, Scharf, 
and Hickey (1972) study, Higgins, et al (1984) stated 
that practical moral judgment is not simply a product 
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of a fixed property of the individual, his or her moral 
competence, but is a product of the interaction between 
his or her competence and the moral features of the 
situation, what we also term the 'moral atmosphere' of 
the social situation in which he or she makes 
decisions, (p. 81) 
Marriage also has an "atmosphere", conceptualized in this 
study as stages of valuing marriage (See Table 4). The 
capacity of the individual to act "morally" could be 
influenced and controlled by the environment (the context of 
the marriage) they live and work in. Valuing marriage is 
the conceptual term for describing the environment of the 
marriage. 
Moral Action and Moral Types 
One of the basic aims of moral development research has 
been to study how persons develop autonomy which has been 
seen as a necessary condition for moral action. The 
philosophic approach to moral development "defines an action 
as being moral in reference to objective and universal 
standards as well as to the individual's own moral 
judgments" (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984, p. 519). Kohlberg and 
his colleagues approached questions about moral action and 
autonomy from a typology perspective to discover "if 
individuals who make an autonomous judgment would be more 
likely to engage in 'moral action1 than individuals who make 
heteronomous moral judgments" (Tappan, Kohlberg, Schrader, 
& Higgins, 1988). Data from previous studies were analyzed 
and tended to support this statement (Kohlberg & Candee, 
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Table 4 
Stages of Valuing Marriage (Commitment) 
I. Marriage is valued as an institution that helps the 
individual meet his/her interpersonal needs and serves 
to protect the individual. 
II. Marriage is valued as an institution that helps an 
individual by allowing them to take care of others in 
exchange of being taken care of. 
III. Marriage is valued as an institution that enables the 
individual to fulfil their obligation to take care of 
their spouse. One's value is based on the ability to 
care for and protect others. 
III/IV. Marriage is valued as an institution because of a 
sense of shared expectations that each will care for 
the other because each is important and valuable. 
There is a self-chosen responsibility to care for self 
and others. 
IV. Marriage is valued as an institution because it is 
conceived as based on cooperation and agreement 
between two equal agents. Marriage is seen as an arena 
for maximizing and promoting individual rights within 
a context of relationship with reciprocity and equity 
being maintained in the relationship. 
20 
1984). If Moral Type B (autonomous) denotes the propensity 
for moral action more than Moral Type A (heteronomous), then 
this typology has implications for a marital relationship. 
The assignment to negotiate and compromise might rest with 
the partner who is more prone to action. The marital 
environment itself can be beneficial in facilitating the 
development of autonomy since the expectation of Tappan et 
al. (1988) in that 
social environments that stress cooperation and mutual 
respect lead to autonomy, while those that stress con­
straint and unilateral respect lead to heteronomy. 
This includes both the environments encountered by 
children and the environments encountered by adults, 
(p. 68) 
Commitment and perception of happiness, components that 
nourish the marital environment, may be dependent upon 
similar moral types in both partners. 
Purpose of the Study 
Moral reasoning development research to this point in 
time has focused on individual development within the 
justice and responsibility orientation. The present study 
focused on moral development of the individual-in-
relationship using commitment and happiness as the common 
ground of both individuals in the relationship of long-term 
marriages. 
Yankelovich (Scanzoni, 1983) defined an ethic of 
commitment specifically as 
a social ethic better equipped to achieve the goals of 
self-fulfillment...in which partners may make mutual 
21 
sacrifices in order to gain greater good for themselves 
and for their relationship simultaneously (p. 166), 
a description Scanzoni claimed "describes decision making 
aimed at maximum joint profit" (p. 166), or, in other words, 
"a sense of equitable reciprocity" (Scanzoni, 1983, p. 165), 
which seems to harmonize with the higher stages of justice 
orientation. Since developing an attitude of commitment 
involves time, the author proposed that the research include 
only individuals in a long term relationship, defined as 15 
to 40 years with the same partner. Rogers, writing 
futuristically in 1972, stated that 
it is becoming increasingly clear that a man-woman 
relationship will have permanence only in the degree in 
which it satisfies the emotional, intellectual, and 
physical needs of the partners. This means that the 
permanent marriage of the future will be even better 
than marriage in the present, because the ideals and 
goals for that marriage will be of a higher order. The 
partners will be demanding more of the relationship 
than they are today. (p. 8) 
The purpose of this study was to describe individuals 
in committed and happy marriages under the assumption that 
they would have similar levels of justice reasoning and 
similar levels of responsibility reasoning. Similarity in 
levels of moral reasoning implies the ability to interpret 
life experiences alike. If partners perceive themselves as 
similarly happy and committed, then it is reasonable to 
expect them to be operating from similar levels of moral 
reasoning. This study was expected to provide empirical 
evidence for the relationship between moral reasoning, 
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commitment, and happiness. Furthermore, it was assumed that 
the levels of justice reasoning and responsibility reasoning 
in happy and committed marriages would be at least on the 
conventional level or above. It was also assumed that both 
individuals in happy and committed marriages would be auton­
omous, that is, both would be moral type B. 
Directional Hypotheses 
Given the literature of moral reasoning, commitment, 
and marital happiness in which it is implied that happiness 
and commitment could be predicted from similar levels of 
moral reasoning, the following directional hypotheses were 
made: 
Individuals in long-term marriages who exhibit 
stages of justice reasoning similar to their 
partner will have similar commitment scores. 
H2 Individuals in long-term marriages who exhibit 
stages of responsibility reasoning similar to 
their partner will have similar commitment scores. 
H3 Individuals in long-term marriages who exhibit 
similar stages of justice reasoning as their 
partners will perceive a similar level of 
happiness. 
H4 Individuals in long-term marriages who exhibit 
similar stages of responsibility reasoning as 
their partners will perceive a similar level of 
happiness. 
Individuals with similar Moral Types as their 
partners will perceive a similar level of 
happiness. 
Individuals in long-term marriages will exhibit 
both a similar stage of responsibility 
reasoning and a similar stage of valuing 
marriage when they exhibit similar levels of 
happiness as their partners. 
Individuals who have similar levels of happiness 
as their partners will also have similar levels of 
commitment to their partners. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose was to study the relationship of justice 
reasoning and responsibility reasoning to commitment and 
perception of happiness in long-term marriages. The process 
of how persons resolve hypothetical and real-life moral 
dilemmas was explored through interviews and questionnaires. 
A pilot study consisting of preliminary interviews with four 
individuals (two couples in long term marriages) were 
conducted in order to test the procedure and instruments. 
Subi ects 
A purposive sample of 30 white men and women with 
children (at home or away), married between 15-40 years, and 
in the middle to upper-middle socio-economic status were 
asked to participate in this project. Since the sample was 
small, homogeneity was necessary to help control for 
extraneous variable effects. Prior to selection, these 30 
individuals were assumed to be committed to remaining 
married and expressed at least moderate happiness with the 
marriage. A letter explaining the purpose of the research 
project was sent to ministers, colleges, and presidents of 
civic organizations in Salisbury and Rowan County asking for 
names and addresses of three couples who fit the criteria 
described above (See Appendix A). The minimum endurance of 
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15 years was set in order to get beyond the age of highest 
divorce rates. The sample used were between 35 and 69 years 
of age and had been married between 17 and 39 years. 
A letter explaining the purpose of the research project 
and asking for their participation was sent to those persons 
named (See Appendix B). They returned a postcard with 
convenient appointment times for the interviews. Individual 
interviews of one to one and one-half hours were conducted 
separately with each of the 30 subjects. 
Data Collection Procedure 
A multi-method technique for data collection was used. 
Each individual completed a consent form (See Appendix C), a 
demographic data form (See Appendix D), perception of 
happiness form (See Appendix E), and a commitment 
questionnaire (Appendix F). The individuals were then asked 
to answer questions concerning the commitment questionnaire 
for self and spouse (See Appendix F). They were also asked 
questions concerning three hypothetical dilemmas (See 
Appendix G) and four real-life dilemmas (See Appendix H). 
Individual interviewing about the dilemmas was 
conducted by the researcher, who is also a marriage and 
family clinician, using several interview guides composed of 
open-ended starter questions. The 30 interviews were 
conducted in the home and were tape-recorded and transcribed 
verbatim for scoring purposes. Each transcription producd 
from 8 to 10 pages per person. The individual was given an 
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opportunity to ask any questions or discuss any part of the 
process. Separate interviews were scheduled sequentially on 
the same visit to the couple's home to ensure 
confidentiality and to encourage an individuals' initiative 
in resolving the dilemmas. 
A valuable asset in this type of project was the 
clinical experience of the researcher. A clinician tends to 
view the family or marriage as a whole while making specific 
observations of the individual. "The crucial difference 
between research and the clinical model of observation is 
not in the type of information that they would make use of. 
The important difference is how this information is 
integrated to create a meaningful whole." (Eisler, Dare, & 
Szmukler, 1988, p. 52). Therapists operate from a 
foundation of theory, their own personal experiences and 
their professional experiences, and, as a result, can 
integrate a wide variety of information that can be used 
during the interview to gather more information. This 
understanding is extremely valuable in interviewing by the 
process of using open-ended structured questions. The 
clinical experience of the researcher was important also, if 
it became necessary to assess concerns of the interviewees 
and deal with them. This did not occur and it was not 
necessary to abort any interview because of anxiety or 
concerns. 
Interviews done for the purpose of research carry with 
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them the bias of the person conducting the interview, 
regardless of the qualifications or training. Experimenter 
bias, even if recognized, was probably also present in this 
project. The Hawthorne effect may be operating when someone 
is being asked to be in a research project; that is, they 
might be more attentive due to the phenomenon of being asked 
to be in research. People also might answer as they want to 
be perceived instead of how they are because of social 
desirability. Questions concerning the nature of the 
project and expected results were asked in several instances 
at the close of the interview. The response was that the 
study was on the structures people use in making decisions 
on the issues in marriage. 
Instuments and Operational Definitions 
The major variables of interest were happiness, 
commitment, justice reasoning, and responsibility reasoning. 
Another variable which was used to understand responsibility 
reasoning better was called "Valuing Marriage" which 
describes the moral atmosphere of marriage. Still another 
variable was measured, the moral type of reasoning, A and B, 
which gives a better understanding of the autonomy of a 
person when making moral decisions. Socioeconomic status 
was measured to describe the sample and to assure 
homogeneity. 
Socio-economic Status 
Middle to upper-middle class was measured by a 
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combination of the variables of occupation (skilled, 
professional, or owner), and education (high school 
graduate, college graduate, or graduate school). All the 
couples in this project satisfied the criterion of middle-
to upper-middle class. Twenty-seven of the 30 persons were 
employed, the majority of whom were employed in the 
professional or executive areas. All couples had at least 
one employed person. Three females were not employed and 
labeled themselves housewives. Of the 30 persons 
interviewed, 22 had college degrees with 10 of those having 
had graduate or professional degrees also. Two families 
were in the income range of $25,000 to $50,000 with the 
remaining 13 families having incomes over $50,000. (See 
Duncan's Socioeconomic Index for complete explanation of 
combining two variables to arrive at social class, Miller, 
1977) . 
Perception of Happiness 
Even though these couples were assumed to be happy, a 
score was necessary for statistical analysis. For this 
study, an individual's perception of a state of feelings, 
defined as happiness by the subject, was used as a 
measurement of perception of happiness, all things being 
considered, with the marital relationship. A spouse's 
global evaluation of the state of the marriage is considered 
a valid measure (Fincham & Bradbury, 1987). It was measured 
by a cumulative score on three questions (See Appendix E), 
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two of which (questions 1 and 3) are from items 31 and 16 of 
the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS) (Spanier, 1976), and the 
third (question 2) a modification of item 20 from the same 
scale. 
Scoring on question 1 was changed to reflect the more 
modern orientation toward equity and reciprocity in 
marriage. "Perfect" was given a score of "0" instead of 
"6" since perfection is probably not available in a dyadic 
relationship. "Very happy" received the highest score of 
"5" since this would tend to describe best a relationship in 
which the partners are comfortable and honest with the 
reality of the situation. "Extremely happy" was scored "4" 
instead of the original "5" since it could reflect a 
societal norm instead of an actual state of feeling. 
Persons might think this is what they "should" feel instead 
of being truthful. Conflicts are common in relationships 
and happiness was assumed to be achieved when an equitable 
settlement of conflict occurs. 
All three questions loaded high on the Spanier's 
factor, Dyadic Satisfaction Factor. The reliability 
coefficient using Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the 
Dyadic Satisfaction Subscale was .94 (Spanier, 1976). 
Spanier also claimed content, criterion, and construct 
validity for the DAS (Spanier, 1976). 
The possible range of scores for the three questions 
used in this study was from 0-13. The categories of 
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perception of happiness for the chi-square method of 
analysis were: Similar to Partner and Dissimilar to Partner 
with Dissimilar defined as a three point difference in 
scores. 
Commitment 
Commitment was defined as a morphogenetic process of 
feelings of cohesion and solidarity that is "generated 
through participation in arrangements that are mutually 
advantageous" (Scanzoni, 1983, p. 177). Commitment in 
individuals in long term marriages was measured by using 
Spanier's measure of commitment (See Appendix F) developed 
in 1971 but was included in his 1976 DAS (item 32). Spanier 
(1976) gave the highest score to the statement, "I want 
desperately for my relationship to succeed, and would go to 
almost anv length to see that it does." The contention in 
the current research was that Spanier's highest scored 
statement coincides more with the socially accepted norm of 
how a spouse "should" behave and feel in a marital 
relationship and reinforces the sex role myths of the "good" 
husband and the "good" wife. When the scale was developed, 
society accepted this proposition as having the highest 
value. This would not agree with the stance that one would 
assume if one believes that a marital relationship is one of 
a mutually binding agreement between equals with equity and 
reciprocity as key ingredients in maintaining the 
relationship. The lowest score was given to the statement 
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"My relationship can never succeed, and there is no more 
that I can do to keep the relationship going" (Spanier, 
1976, p. 28). 
Therefore, the author suggested a new scoring system 
for commitment with the highest scored statement being "I 
want very much for my relationship to succeed, and will do 
all I can to see that it does," (See Appendix F for new 
scoring of statements). The rearrangement of the scoring 
seems to fit better with the present-day emphasis on an 
emerging ethic of commitment which is composed of elements 
of mutuality, trust, and maximum joint profit. The possible 
range of scores was from 0-5. The scoring of commitment for 
the chi-square analysis was on two levels: Similar to 
Partner; Dissimilar to Partner with Dissimilar being 
defined as a one point difference. 
Stages of Justice Reasoning 
Kohlberg's (1981) hypothetical standard dilemmas, like 
the Heinz dilemma (See Appendix G) were scored to arrive at 
a stage score of deontic judgment of justice orientation. 
The Standard Issue Scoring method was used (See Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1988, for complete description of scoring) (See 
Appendix G for Standard Issue Scoring Form). It has proven 
useful in a variety of settings for ascertaining a stage 
score for moral judgment general competence. The standard 
dilemmas elicit "should" and not "would" answers in response 
to dilemmas of justice. 
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As with most instruments of this nature, questions of 
reliability and validity arise. Colby and Kohlberg (1988) 
reported test-retest reliability ranging from .92 to .96 
with interrater agreement ranging from 88% to 100% within a 
third of a stage and 75% to 88% for complete agreement. 
"The correlation for raters 1 and 2 on the form A test-
retest interviews was .98 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1988)." 
In order to assure that the scoring for the present 
research was reliable, six randomly selected interviews were 
scored by an expert scorer, who was a Senior Research 
Assistant at Harvard University, Graduate School of 
Education, Center for Moral Development and Education. For 
the six interviews, interrater agreement with the Harvard 
expert rater and a trained researcher at this University was 
83.3% There was 100% agreement within one-half stage 
between the researcher and the Harvard rater. Also there 
was a 100% agreement between the researcher and the trained 
researcher at this University. The correlation for the 
researcher and the trained researcher at this University was 
.96 using Pearson r with interrater agreement being 93% at 
the same stage or within one-half stage (the smallest 
increment between stages). These findings seem to fall 
within acceptable ranges for reliability among scorers. 
The responses were scored to obtain a stage score for 
justice reasoning and a Moral Maturity Score (MMS) or global 
score (Colby & Kohlberg, 1988). Possible stage scores were 
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1, 1/2, 2, 2/3, 3, 3/4, 4, 4/5, and 5 for a range of 0-5. 
Each scorable interview was weighted by the stage it was 
judged to represent resulting in a Moral Maturity Score 
(MMS) with a possible range from 100-500. The categories of 
justice reasoning for chi-square analysis were these: 
Similar to Partner defined as within one-half stage and 
Dissimilar to Partner defined as one whole stage or more 
apart. 
Stages of Responsibility Reasoning 
Responsibility reasoning is a measure of aretaic 
judgments, that is, judgments concerned with the personal 
worth and special responsibilities toward persons that are 
part of the intimate network of relationships. A 
preliminary scoring manual (See Appendix H) was developed 
from pilot interviews for scoring responsibility reasoning 
used in resolving real-life dilemmas. The manual was 
revised when additional material became available. 
Kohlberg's model for developing the responsibility reasoning 
scoring manual was used (Colby, & Kohlberg, 1988). Since a 
definitive coding system for responsibility judgments was 
not available, the criteria and rules that were used to 
define and score judgments of responsibility in a prior 
study were adapted (Higgins, et al., 1984, adapted with 
permission) to fit real-life marriage dilemmas. These 
stages of responsibility judgments were initially derived 
from Gilligan's (1977) research. 
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The manual for scoring stages of responsibility 
reasoning (as adapted) gives the stage structure, criterion 
judgments and match examples for each of the four stages and 
two transition stages which correspond to Gilligan's (1977) 
three levels and two transition levels. A stage structure 
is an abstract description of the qualitative phenomenon 
which differentiates general cognitive structure from 
ethical content in the area under study, in this case, 
marriage as an arena for responsibility. The stage of 
sociomoral perspective from which the individual formulates 
a responsibility judgment was the basic structure that was 
looked for in the interview. A criterion judgment was a 
statement that used concepts directly from the content of 
the issue being studied and was descriptive of the stage. 
Match examples were verbatim illustrations of the criterion 
judgment from the interview that were scored in that 
particular stage of responsibility reasoning. 
The following procedure was used in developing the 
scoring manual: All interviews from the pilot study were 
read and the verbatim illustrations that seemed to be 
expressive of stage structures were isolated. These 
statements included both ego statements (I or he, she) and 
prescriptive judgments (shoulds and oughts). These 
statements were grouped by stage and content. A criterion 
judgment that seemed to express the same idea had been 
developed for each developmental stage from the responses on 
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the pilot interviews. A scorable statement was one from an 
interview in which a moral judgment was rendered concerning 
the issue and was called "interview judgments." Match 
examples were illustrative quotations which embody the 
concepts of the criterion judgments. Two independent judges 
read all pilot interviews to determine if the criterion 
judgments and match examples were consistently placed for 
each responsibility stage in the manual. Matched examples 
from the 30 research interviews were used for the stages not 
represented in the pilot interviews, and they were added to 
the scoring manual as illustrative material. 
After the 30 interviews were conducted, scorable 
statements (interview judgments) for each interview were 
compared with the model statements of the criterion 
judgments and the match examples for determining which stage 
of responsibility reasoning was being used. Since each 
individual verbalized many reasons for decisions, there was 
more than one stage expressed in one interview. Each 
statement was scored according to the particular stage that 
it matched. The method of scoring developed by Colby and 
Kohlberg (1988) was used to arrive at a responsibility stage 
score and a Responsibility Maturity Score (RMS). 
Interrater reliability was established for the 
responsibility reasoning stages of the 30 participants by 
the use of two trained scorers who have had previous 
experience with this type of scoring. Of the 414 statements 
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scored in the responsibility dilemmas, the first reliability 
check yielded agreement on 365 of the statements for an 88% 
agreement rate. Of the remaining 49 statements, 34 were 
agreed upon after consultation between the scorers yielding 
a 94% agreement rate. The other 15 statements out of the 
414 statements had to have negotiation for agreement, 
resulting in 100%. 
The stage scores were in agreement (the same stage or 
within one-half stage) 87% (26 out of 30 interviews) on 
first review. Of the remaining four interviews, two were 
accepted by the scorers yielding a 93% agreement rate. Two 
remaining interviews received a stage score different from 
that of the first scoring via agreement of the scorers. The 
original scores by both scorers agreed with the final stage 
score at a 97% agreement rate (29 out of 30). One score 
each differed by one stage from the final score. Together 
they agreed at a 93% agreement rate (28 out of 30). There 
was a 100% agreement by both scorers on the final stage 
score. 
Construct validity was assumed by following the Colby 
and Kohlberg's model for manual development. The responses 
for responsibility reasoning were scored for a stage score 
and a Responsibility Maturity Score (RMS). Possible stage 
scores were 1, 2, 2/3, 3, 3/4, and 4 for a total of 4 whole 
stages and two transitions. Possible Responsibility 
Maturity Scores (RMS) were from 100 to 400. The categories 
37 
of responsibility reasoning for chi-square analysis were 
these: Similar to Partner defined as same stage as partner 
and Dissimilar to Partner defined as one-half stage 
difference between partners. Kohlberg, Gilligan, and 
Higgins used different ordering systems in structuring the 
layers of moral reasoning. When Kohlberg's Stages of 
Justice Reasoning are correlated with Gilligan's Ethic of 
Responsibility and Higgins' Responsibility Reasoning, whole 
stage differences (according to Kohlberg's scheme) became 
one-half stage/level difference in Gilligan's and Higgins1 
nomenclature. Therefore, a whole stage difference in Stages 
of Justice Reasoning is the equivalent measure of one-half 
stage difference in Responsibility Reasoning (See Appendix 
J for Comparison of the Stages of Kohlberg, Gilligan, and 
Higgins). 
Stages of Valuing Marriage 
Stages of valuing marriage is conceptualized as a 
measurable entity for the "moral atmosphere" of the 
marriage. If "a judgment of responsibility is the mediating 
bridge from a deontic judgment of rightness and justice to 
moral action" (Higgins, et al., 1984, p. 74), then it 
becomes important to assess the atmosphere of the marriage 
since the context of the marriage becomes an active place 
for persons to behave or be morally active in a responsible 
manner toward other persons. In response to questions 
concerning the level of commitment of a partner, it was 
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possible to ascertain which stage of valuing marriage a 
person has achieved. The stages of valuing marriage are 
given in Appendix F and parallel the stages of justice 
reasoning and responsibility reasoning. A scoring key was 
developed by the author (See Appendix F) by matching 
examples given by the participants with the appropriate 
stage. A numerical value was assigned to each stage score 
for purposes of statistical analysis. The possible stage 
scores were I (100), II (200), II/III (250), III (300), 
III/IV (350), and IV (400). The stage of valuing marriage 
was compared with the stage of responsibility reasoning for 
each individual. The categories for chi-square analysis 
were Similar to Self defined as stage of Valuing Marriage 
within 49 points of their RMS and Dissimilar to Self defined 
as stage of Valuing Marriage as 50 points or more different 
from their RMS. A spread of 50 points or more is the 
equivalent of a half-stage difference between stages. 
Moral Types A and B 
Kohlberg and his associates (Tappan, Kohlberg, 
Schrader, & Higgins, 1988), using Piaget's work on moral 
autonomy (1932/1965) as a starting point, have studied the 
question of moral types or substages for several years, and 
they now conclude that there seems to be a heteronomous type 
(A) and an autonomous type (B) within each stage. The 
autonomous type (B) adult is able to make decisions under 
conditions of mutual respect, or awareness of importance of 
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cooperation among equals which entails reciprocity and 
freedom, without reference to external authority or laws for 
justification or validation (See Colby and Kohlberg, 1988, 
for complete description of moral types). The heteronomous 
type (A) adult is more sensitive to conformity and obedience 
to authority and to authority-made rules. Within marriages, 
as adults strive toward an ethic of responsibility, equity 
and cooperation are essential elements for negotiating 
conflictual decisions. Therefore, the moral type of the 
individual would have an influence on the type of decision­
making processes that occur. The moral type of the 
individuals in long-term marriages was scored using the 
scoring manual developed by Tappan, et al (1988). They 
noted inter-rater reliability of moral types was 85% 
agreement across both forms used. Test-retest reliability 
was 95% for Form A and 94% for Form B. Scoring was done 
using nine general criteria that reflect an ideal topology 
of autonomous judgments (See Appendix J for Moral Type 
Scoring Form). Heteronomous typing was indicated when one 
did not pass the critical criteria for moral type B. 
The responses to the justice dilemmas in this research 
were read to determine the presence or absence of the 
critical criteria. The scores were categorized, A or B. 
Couple scores were AA, BB, or AB. The categories for chi-
square analysis were Similar to Partner defined as 
classified as same Moral Type (AA or BB) and Dissimilar to 
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Partner defined as classified as different Moral Type (AB or 
BA) . 
Limitations 
Limitations present in every research project include 
the realization that the operational definitions and the 
chosen variables might not capture the theoretical concepts 
in the fullest sense. Limitations of instrumentation are 
present in this study. One is never sure whether the 
instrument is measuring the concept one hopes to measure, or 
whether the instrument gives one an accurate assessment of 
the quantity or quality of the concept measured. Even 
though validity is claimed for several of the instruments, 
there are still questions as to the construct validity. 
Several instruments were adapted from other instruments for 
this project and, as of yet, no support is available to 
render a judgment to their validity except for face validity 
and agreement among two other judges. Even with these 
limitations, it is important to develop new methods and 
instruments for capturing the unique dimensions of 
individuals in long-term relationships that will further 
understanding of the human condition. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
The data for the research were collected from 30 in­
dividuals (15 couples) in long term marriages residing in a 
Piedmont county of North Carolina. During the fall and 
winter of 1986, these individuals were interviewed about 
their perception of happiness and commitment within a long 
term marriage*. 
Statistical Approach to the Data 
The chi-square test of independence was chosen as the 
most appropriate statistical technique by which to examine 
the research question about frequencies of individuals who 
were similar or dissimilar on the variables of commitment, 
happiness, and moral reasoning. This test of relatedness or 
independence has been described as a "goodness of fit" 
technique since it permits a determination of whether "a 
significant difference exists between the observed number of 
cases appearing in each category and the expected number of 
cases specified under the null hypothesis" (Runyon & Haber, 
1984, p. 370). The Yates correction for continuity was used 
to "improve the approximation of the sampling distribution 
of chi-square to its distribution with one degree of 
freedom" (Glass & Stanley, 1970, p. 332). Even though "most 
textbooks recommend that expected cell frequencies equal or 
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exceed 5 when df = l," Runyon and Haber (1984) have dropped 
this recommendation based on "convincing evidence" (p. 363). 
The expected frequencies were computed from the marginal 
totals rather than from prior hypothesis. All computations 
were done by the researcher. 
Commitment Variable 
The majority (21) of the individuals scored 5 out of a 
possible range from 0-5 on commitment (See Table 5). There 
were 20 individuals who had a similar commitment score 
(exactly the same score) as their partner. There were 10 
individuals who were dissimilar with a difference of one 
point. 
Justice Reasoning 
Although 26 individuals used stages of justice 
reasoning similar to their partners, the range of actual 
justice reasoning stages used by them was from the 
transition stage 2/3 to the transition stage 4/5 (See Table 
6). Of the total group of 30, 27 of them scored in the 
conventional level: 13 people scored in the transition 
stage 3/4, which is characterized by adherence to the roles 
of society with a view that the stability of society is 
based on carrying out expected role behaviors; nine used 
stage 3 and three used stage 4, two people were scored in 
the transition stage 4/5. Only one scored in the top 
justice reasoning, stage 5, use of equity principles in 
decision making. Two people scored in the transition stage 
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Table 5 
Commitment and Happiness Scores of Partners in Long-Term 
Marriages in Two Categories: Similar to Partner and 
Dissimilar to Partner (Ranked bv Wife) 
A. Commitment * B. Happiness ** 
Similar to Partner Similar to Partner 
Wife Husband Wife Husband 
5 5 12 12 
5 5 12 12 
5 5 12 12 
5 5 12 12 
5 5 12 12 
5 5 12 12 
5 5 12 12 
5 5 12 12 
3 3 12 12 
3 3 11 13 
Dissimilar to Partner 11 10 
5 4 8 8 
5 3 Dissimilar to Partner 
5 3 12 8 
5 3 8 12 
4 5 8 11 
N = 30 N = 30 
* Commitment: Range = 0-5; Similar = exactly same; 
Dissimilar = one point difference 
** Happiness: Range = 0-13; Similar = two points or under; 
Dissimilar = Three or more points difference 
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Table 6 
Justice Reasoning and Responsibility Reasoning Stages of 
Partners in Long-Term Marriages in Two Categories; 
Similar to Partner and Dissimilar to Partner (Ranked by 
Wife) 
A. Justice Reasoning 
Similar to Partner 
Wife Husband 
Stage (MMS)* Stage (MMS) 
4/5 (446) 4/5 (445) 
3/4 (375) 3/4 (371) 
3/4 (368) 3/4 (350) 
3/4 (367) 4 (402) 
3/4 (347) 3/4 (360) 
3/4 (333) 3/4 (327) 
3 (323) 3/4 (369) 
3 (315) 3/4 (369) 
3 (307) 3/4 (333) 
3 (303) 3 (322) 
3 (298) 3/4 (360) 
3 (292) 3 (306) 
2/3 (289) 2/3 (282) 
Dissimilar to Partner*** 
4 (397) 5 (487) 
3 (269) 4 (378) 
N = 30 
B. Responsibility Reasoning 
Similar to Partner 
Wife Husband 
Stage (RMS)** Stage(RMS) 
4 (401) 4 (392) 
3/4 (342) 
3/4 (341) 
3/4 (333) 
3 (302) 
3/4 (341) 
3/4 (379) 
3/4 (326) 
3 (311) 
Dissimilar to Partner*** 
3/4 (330) 4 (393) 
3/4 (326) 3 (305) 
3 (317) 2/3 (270) 
3 (306) 2/3 (267) 
3 (303) 2/3 (254) 
3 (300) 3/4 (337) 
3 (293) 3/4 (336) 
3 (292) 3/4 (324) 
3 (285) 2/3 (266) 
2/3 (259) 3 (303) 
N = 30 
* MMS = Moral Maturity Score; ** RMS = Responsibility 
Maturity Score; *** Dissimilar; Justice = one whole stage, 
Responsibility = one-half stage (See Appendix J) 
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2/3, which implies that they were only beginning to move out 
of the exchange level of justice reasoning. The spread of 
justice reasoning levels of this group of 3 0 individuals 
fits the norm for adults in the United States (Kohlberg, 
1984) . 
It was hypothesized that individuals in long term 
marriages who exhibit stages of justice reasoning similar to 
their partner would have similar commitment scores (H^). 
Dissimilar justice scores were one stage different from 
their partner. Dissimilar commitment scores were one point 
different from their partner. The statistics for the 
contingency table of justice reasoning and commitment 
produced a X2 = 8.22 (df = 1) ( See Table 7). Since the 
obtained X exceeded this value, was not rejected. The 
examination of the data reveals a clear-cut tendency for 
similar stages of justice reasoning to be moderately related 
(C = .464) to similar scores of commitment. 
Responsibility Reasoning 
Ten individuals scored the same stage as their partner 
in responsibility reasoning. Twenty individuals were one-
half stage different from their partner and 20 were called 
Dissimilar to Partner (Refer to Table 6). The scores 
ranged from transition stage 2/3 to whole stage 4, with 22 
individuals (11 at stage 3 and 11 at transition stage 3/4) 
in the conventional level. Only three scored at stage 4. 
Five scored at the transition stage of 2/3. 
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Table 7 
Frequencies of Individuals for Similarity to Partners in 
Justice Reasoning bv Similarity in Commitment 
Commitment 
a 
Similar Dissimilar— 
20(17.4) 6(8.60) 
row 77% 23% 
col 100% 60% 
Dissimilar to Partner 0(2.60) 4(1.60) 
row 0% 100% 
col 0% 40% 
N = 30 
X2 = 8.22; df = 1; p < 0.01; C = .464 
cl 
^Dissimilar commitment scores = one point difference 
Dissimilar justice reasoning scores = one whole stage 
Overall, the responsibility reasoning stages were a 
little more than one-half stage lower than justice reasoning 
stages. In previous research, it was found that reasoning 
from real-life moral dilemmas, from which responsibility 
reasoning scores come, tend to give slightly lower scores 
(Gilligan, 1977). The explanation for this may be that in 
hypothetical dilemmas, a respondent uses more ideal 
statements than when confronted with a real-life moral 
dilemma. 
The hypotheses was that individuals in long-term 
marriages who exhibit stages of responsibility reasoning 
Justice Reasoning 
Similar to Partner 
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similar to their partner would have similar commitment 
scores (H2). Since the chi-square test of independence 
tests for the null hypothesis, the null hypothesis for H2 
would be: There would be no difference in similarity to 
partner in commitment scores between individuals in long-
term marriages who exhibit responsibility reasoning scores 
similar to their partner. The statistics of the contingency 
table of responsibility reasoning and commitment produced a 
X2 = 4.77 (df = 1) (See Table 8). Since the X2 exceeded 
this value, the null hypothesis was rejected, but also the 
proposed directional hypothesis was rejected. The number of 
individuals with similarity of responsibility reasoning 
scores to partner, predicted to exhibit similarity of 
commitment scores, actually was lower than the number of 
individuals with dissimilar to partner scores producing an 
opposite relationship from the hypothesized relationship. 
Happiness Variable 
It was expected that these 30 individuals would be at 
least moderately happy. In fact, the majority of the 
individuals were happy to very happy as indicated from the 8 
to 13 range of actual happiness scores on a scale from 0-13 
(Refer to Table 5). Most (19) of the individuals scored 12. 
Similarity of happiness scores was observed in 24 
individuals. 
Justice Reasoning 
It was hypothesized that individuals in long-term 
48 
Table 8 
Frequencies of Individuals for Similarity to Partners in 
Responsibility Reasoning bv Similarity to Partners in 
Commitment 
Responsibility 
Reasoning 
Similar to Partner 
Dissimilar to Partner 
row 
col 
row 
col 
Commitment 
Similar Dissimilar1 
4(6.67) 6(3.33) 
40% 
20% 
60% 
60% 
16(13.33) 4(6.67) 
80% 
80% 
20% 
40% 
X = 4.77; df = 1; E < .05? C = .371 
a 
^Dissimilar commitment scores = one point difference 
Dissimilar responsibility scores = one/half stage 
marriages who exhibit stages of justice reasoning similar to 
their partner would have similar happiness scores (H3). 
Dissimilar happiness scores were equal a three-point 
difference between partners. The results indicated that 
happiness scores were strongly related to similarity in 
justice reasoning. The statistics of the contingency table 
of justice reasoning and happiness produced a X = 11.313 
(df = 1) (See Table 9). Since the obtained value of X2 
exceeded this value, H3 was not rejected. Examination of 
the data reveals a strong relationship (C = .523) between 
similarity of stages of justice reasoning and similarity of 
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Table 9 
Frequencies of Individuals for Similarity to Partners in 
Justice Reasoning bv Similarity to Partners in Perception 
of Happiness 
Happiness 
a 
Justice Reasoning Similiar Dissimilar 
Similar to Partner 24(20.8) 2(5.192) 
row 92% 8% 
col 100% 33% 
u 
Dissimilar to Partner 0(3.2) 4(0.8) 
row 0% 100% 
col 0% 67% 
N = 30 
X2 = 11.313; df = 1; p < .001; C = .523 
a 
.Dissimilar = 3 points difference 
Dissimilar = one whole stage difference 
perception of happiness scores. 
Responsibility reasoning 
The hypothesis was that individuals in long-term 
marriages who exhibit similar stages of responsibility 
reasoning as their partners would perceive a similar level 
of happiness (H4). The statistics of the contingency table 
of similarity of responsibility reasoning scores and 
2 perception of happiness produced a X = .9083 (See Table 
10). This hypothesis was rejected and the null hypothesis 
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Table 10 
Frequencies of Individuals for Similarity to Partners in 
Responsibility Reasoning by Similarity to Partners of 
Perception of Happiness 
Happiness 
cl Responsibility Similar Dissimilar 
Reasoning 
Similar to Partner 8(7.9) 2(2.1) 
row 80% 20% 
col 33% 33% 
V 
Dissimilar to Partner 16(16.1) 4(3.9) 
row 80% 20% 
col 67% 67% 
N = 30 
2  . . .  X = .9083; df = 1; No significant relationship 
bDissimilar = 3 points difference 
Dissimilar = one-half stage 
was accepted indicating no relationship between similarity 
of responsibility reasoning and perception of happiness 
scores. 
Moral Types 
The individuals were almost evenly divided between 
Moral Type B (14) and Moral Type A (16). The individuals 
were almost evenly divided into Similar to Partner, (14) 
with 8 being homogenous AA and 6 being homogeneous BB, and 
Dissimilar to Partner, (16) 6 had wife A and husband B, and 
10 had wife B and husband A (See Table 11). 
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Moral Types and Justice Reasoning of Partners in Long-term 
Marriages bv Two Categories: Similarity to Partner in Moral 
Table 11 
 
 
Type and Dissimilarity to Partner in Moral Type 
Similarity to Partner in Moral Types 
Wife (Husband) Justice Stage Husband (Wife) Justice Stage 
A (A)  3/4 A (A) 3/4 
B (B) 4 B (B) 5 
A (A) 3 A (A) 3/4 
B (B) 4/5 B (B) 4/5 
A (A) 3 A (A) 3 
B (B) 3/4 B (B) 3/4 
A (A) 3/4 A (A) 3/4 
Dissimilarity to Partner in Moral Type 
B (A) 3/4 A (B) 3/4 
A (B) 3 B (A) 4 
B (A) 2/3 A (B) 2/3 
B (A) 3 A (B) 3/4 
A (B) 3 B (A) 3/4 
A (B) 3/4 B (A) 4 
B (A) 3 A (B) 3 
B (A) 3 A (B) 3/4 
N = 30 
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The hypothesis was that individuals with similar Moral 
Types would have similar perceived levels of happiness (H5). 
The statistics for the contingency table of moral type and 
happiness produced a X2 = .769 (df = 1) (See Table 12). 
This hypothesis was not supported. There was no significant 
relationship between similarity of partners in moral types 
and similarity of partners in perception of happiness. 
Table 12 
Frequencies of Individuals for Similarity to Partners in 
Moral Types bv Similarity to Partners in Perception of 
Happiness 
Moral Type 
Similar to Partner 
Dissimilar to Partner 
N = 30 
Happiness 
Similar 
12(11.2) 
row 86% 
col 50% 
row 
col 
12(12.8) 
75% 
50% 
Dissimilar6 
2 ( 2 . 8 )  
135 
33' 
4(3.2) 
25% 
67% 
X = .769; df = 1; No significant relationship 
Stage of Responsibility Reasoning and 
Stage of Valuing Marriage 
Exactly half of the individuals in the research study 
(15) had similar stage scores on responsibility reasoning 
and valuing marriage (See Table 13). Thirteen of the 15 
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Table 13 
Similarity of Responsibility Stages and Valuing Marriage 
Stages for Each Individual bv Similarity to Partner in 
Happiness Scores 
Happiness 
Scores 
Similar to 
Partner 
Responsibility and Valuing Stages for Each 
Individual 
Similar Stages 
Dissimilar*** 
to Partner 
Wives Husbands 
Dissimilar Stages** 
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands 
RMS VM* RMS VM* RMS VM* RMS VM* 
401 400 392 400 342 400 337 400 
333 300 341 300 306 200 326 200 
326 350 336 300 303 200 305 200 
317 300 324 300 300 350 267 200 
302 300 311 300 254 200 
293 300 270 300 
292 300 266 300 
285 300 
N = 15 N = = 9 
Wives Husbands 
RMS VM* RMS VM* 
341 400 393 300 
330 400 379 300 
259 200 303 200 
N = 6 
* VM = Valuing Marriage converted to numerical score 
** Dissimilar Responsibility scores and VM = 50 points 
*** Dissimilar to Partner = 3 points 
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scored on the conventional level on both scales. 
The 15 who had Dissimilar stages in responsibility 
reasoning and valuing marriage were split between Similar to 
Partner in perception of happiness (9) and Dissimilar to 
Partner in perception of happiness (6). Of the 15 
individuals who had responsibility reasoning and valuing 
marriage scores dissimilar, 8 of them scored in stage II of 
valuing marriage which depicts marriage as valued as an 
institution that helps individuals by allowing them to take 
care of others in exchange for being taken care of. 
Overall the wives tended to score higher on Stage of 
Valuing Marriage than did the husbands with 6 wives scoring 
stage III/IV or IV and only 2 of the husbands above stage 
III. This would be an expected finding in the general 
population since women are assumed to have more invested in 
marriage and, therefore, they would work harder to have a 
"meaningful" marriage. In this purposive sample, however, 
the expectation was that the husbands and wives would 
equally share the desire for an accepting atmosphere instead 
of viewing marriage as exchange. 
It was hypothesized that each individual in a long-
term marriage who had a similar stage on both responsibility 
reasoning and valuing marriage would have levels of 
happiness similar to their partners (Hg). The statistics 
of the contingency table of individual similarity of stages 
of responsibility reasoning and valuing marriage with 
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2 happiness scores similar to partner produced a X = 8.672 
2 
(df = 1) (See Table 14). Since the obtained value of X 
exceeded this value, Hg was not rejected. 
Table 14 
Frequencies of Individuals for Similarity to Partners 
in Perception of Happiness bv Similarity of Self in 
Responsibility Reasoning and Stage of Valuing Marriage 
Responsibility Reasoning 
and Stage of Valuing 
Marriage 
Similar Self Scores 
Dissimilar Self Scores 
N = 30 
b 
row 
col 
row 
col 
Happiness 
Similar 
15(12) 
100% 
62.5% 
9(12) 
60% 
37.5% 
Dissimilar-
0(3) 
0% 
0% 
6(3) 
40% 
100% 
YT = 7.69; df = 1; p < .01; C = .451 
cl .Dissimilar = 3 points difference 
Dissimilar = 50 points difference between RMS and Stage 
of Valuing Marriage 
Examination of the data reveals a moderate relationship (C = 
.451) between similarity of both stages of responsibility 
reasoning and valuing marriage, and happiness. 
Commitment 
It was hypothesized that there would be similar levels 
of happiness in partners when there is similarity of 
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commitment in partners (H7). The statistics for the 
contingency table of commitment and happiness produced a 
X2 = 5.609 (df = 1) (See Table 15). Since the obtained 
X exceeded this value, H7 was not rejected. Examination 
of the data revealed a low relationship (C = .396) for 
commitment scores to be related to similarity in happiness 
scores. 
Table 15 
Frequencies of Individuals for Similarity to Partners in 
Perception of Happiness bv Similarity to Partners in 
Commitment 
Happiness 
a 
Commitment Scores Similar Dissimilar 
Similar to Partner 18(16) 2(4) 
row 90% 10% 
col 75% 33% 
Dissimilar to Partner 6(8) 4(2) 
row 67% 33% 
col 25% 67% 
N = 30 
X2 = 5.609; df = 1; E < .05; C = .396 
a 
. Dissimilar happiness scores = 3 points difference 
Dissimilar commitment scores = 1 point difference 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The major purposes of this study were (a) to describe 
justice reasoning and responsibility reasoning in 
individuals involved in long-term marriages and (b) to 
assess the relationship of justice reasoning and 
responsibility reasoning to commitment to the relationship 
and perceived happiness in these individuals. One unique 
feature of this research concerned studying both individuals 
involved in the long-term marriage to determine similarities 
and dissimilarities within the non-clinical couple. Most 
studies in justice reasoning and responsibility reasoning 
have been conducted with individuals while most studies in 
marital conflict have used couples in therapy or large 
surveys. 
A purposive sample of 30 individuals, partners in 15 
long-term marriages of 15-40 years, were selected from 
recommendations of community leaders in one Piedmont county 
in North Carolina. To be included in the research, the 
couple had to have had at least one child and claim a 
moderate level of satisfaction with the marriage. The 
actual length of marriage ranged from 17-39 years. Ages of 
the individuals ranged from 35-69. All the couples were 
white and upper-middle class. 
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Separate in-depth interviews were tape-recorded using 
hypothetical and real life dilemmas, which were later 
transcribed verbatim and scored. Instruments concerning 
demographic data, commitment, and perception of happiness 
were completed. The data were analyzed by the chi-square 
test of independence with the contingency coefficient 
employed as a measure of the strength of the association. 
Summary of Findings 
The hypothesized relationship between justice 
reasoning, responsibility reasoning, commitment, and 
happiness were supported by the data. These analyses 
revealed: 
1. That individuals in long-term marriages who 
exhibited stages of justice reasoning similar to 
their partner did have similar commitment scores as 
their partners. 
2. That individuals in long-term marriages who 
exhibited stages of responsibility reasoning 
similar to their partner had dissimilar 
commitment scores as their partners. 
3. That individuals in long-term marriages who 
exhibited stages of justice reasoning similar to 
their partner did perceive a similar level of 
happiness as their partners. 
4. That individuals in long-term marriages who scored 
a stage of responsibility reasoning similar to 
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their own stage of valuing marriage did perceive a 
similar level of happiness as their partners. 
5. That there were similar levels of happiness in 
partners when there was similarity of commitment in 
partners. 
The data revealed that there was not a significant 
relationship between: 
1. Similarity of moral types and perceived levels of 
happiness. 
2. Similarity of responsibility reasoning scores and 
perceived levels of happiness. 
The purpose of these analyses was to determine if there 
was a significant relationship between similarity in 
partners in justice reasoning and responsibility reasoning 
to commitment and perception of happiness. The data 
supported the hypothesis concerning similarity in partners 
in justice reasoning and commitment and happiness. The data 
were mixed concerning similarity of responsibility reasoning 
scores and commitment and happiness. There was an 
unexpected relationship between responsibility reasoning and 
commitment and no significant relationship to happiness. 
Discussion 
In trying to assess the various components of a 
committed and happy marriage, several factors appear. 
Rogers (1977) enumerated his thoughts on the characteristics 
of a mature and happy relationship: 
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To the degree that each partner becomes truly a free 
agent, then the relationship only has a permanence if 
the partners are committed to each other, are in good 
communication with each other, accept each other as 
separate persons, and live together as persons, not 
roles. This is a new and mature kind of relationship 
toward which many couples are striving, (p. 55) 
The merging of the four characteristics of commitment, 
communication, dissolution of roles, and becoming a separate 
self create an atmosphere in which perception of happiness 
can occur. The cognitive/developmental theory of moral 
reasoning gives a framework for helping persons strive for 
such a relationship. The justice orientation of moral 
reasoning encourages dissolution of roles and becoming a 
separate self by encouraging decisions based on rights, 
fairness and equity. The responsibility orientation of 
moral reasoning encourages commitment and communication by 
encouraging decisions based on caring and connection to 
relationships. 
The endurance of long term marriages, conceptualized as 
commitment, may be explained as the ability of two partners 
to use similar stages of justice reasoning to resolve 
conflicts. Similarity in justice reasoning was related to 
similar levels of commitment (H^). When two partners use 
similar structures (stages) or similar rationale to arrive 
at decisions, they would be able to understand how each 
arrived at their end point even if the decision was 
different. If the two partners are operating at similar 
stages, then their views of equity and fairness would be 
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similar, and the outcome would produce positive feelings 
expressed as perception of happiness. Perhaps, perceived 
happiness, also related to similarity of justice reasoning 
(H3), became the reinforcing element of an enduring 
relationship. 
Dissimilarity to partners of responsibility reasoning 
scores yielded a greater number of persons who were similar 
to their partners in commitment scores, the opposite of the 
predicted hypothesis. There would be several explanations 
for this unexpected finding. The first explanation concerns 
the instrument itself. As Miller, Rollins, and Thomas 
(1982) suggested, "When problems of fit are raised, 
researchers in essence are questioning the validity of the 
operationalization of theoretical constructs and 
relationships between constructs" (p. 860). Whenever one 
uses a new instrument that has had limited testing, the 
researcher must consider construct validity as a possible 
explanation for unexpected findings. Miller, et al also 
suggested that more attention should be paid to measurement 
variance as a factor in unexpected findings. Sensitivity in 
determining the scoring levels of responsibility reasoning 
could explain why the division of similarity to partner and 
dissimilar to partner was skewed in the non-predicted 
direction. A more plausible explanation concerns trying to 
simplify for research reasons, a complex interaction between 
partners. Responsibility reasoning deals with making moral 
62 
decisions about everyday life events that occur within 
marriage. As Gilligan (1982) noted, decisions in the 
responsibility realm are usually based on relationships, 
caring, and connection. Commitment to a relationship or a 
person takes precedence over similarity of thinking or 
deciding. Likewise, similarity of thinking or deciding does 
not guarantee similarity of commitment. 
There was not a significant relationship between 
similarity of responsibility reasoning scores and perception 
of happiness. Indeed, 80% of the individuals in both 
categories, similar to partner (8) and dissimilar to partner 
(16), were similar to partner in perception of happiness 
(24). Because of the large number of individuals who were 
dissimilar to their partner in responsibility reasoning 
scores, one might suspect an instrument problem, such as 
construct validity, measurement error, or insensitivity of 
the measurement to the different stages of responsibility 
reasoning. Another explanation of this unexpected finding 
concerned the question of whether dissimilarity to partner 
in responsibility reasoning scores has anything to do with 
perception of happiness. Perhaps everyone "expects" their 
partner to deal with real-life dilemmas differently from 
them, and therefore, it does not affect over-all global 
measure of happiness. 
The moral atmosphere of the marriage was assessed 
through the scale of Stages of Valuing Marriage which 
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measured the importance of the marriage to the individuals 
involved. The context of the marriage provided the active 
place for the partners to behave toward one another in a 
responsible manner. Similarity between one's score on 
responsibility reasoning and valuing marriage yielded a 
similarity of perception of happiness (Hg). If one feels 
free to act in a responsible manner toward the partner, then 
feelings of happiness would be generated. For example, if 
partners wanted to behave in a caring manner toward their 
spouse, they would feel good about the act instead of 
worrying about being questioned as to motives or suspicions 
about why they were doing it. 
When partners express similar commitment levels, then 
they would also have positive feelings (perception of 
happiness) that would be similar (H7). The matrix of 
elements that compose marital satisfaction is usually based 
on perceptions of several elements, i.e., "empathy, along 
with sexuality and companionship—both of which are 
influenced by empathy...develop from past experiences and 
their significance...lies in what is known as commitment to 
the relationship" (Scanzoni & Szinovacz, p. 40). Although 
this, perhaps, is a chicken-egg question since both 
commitment and happiness can become reinforcing elements of 
each other. 
It was unexpected that there was not a significant 
relationship between moral types (indicative of action) and 
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happiness. One would have expected similar partners, with 
each more prone to action or each more passive, to be 
similar to their partners in perception of happiness since a 
similar moral types would be more harmonious than dissimilar 
types. In the original studies done on moral types (Tappan, 
et al., 1988), there were significant relationships between 
age, moral stage and moral type. The older the person and 
the higher the justice stage score, the more likely they 
were to make autonomous moral judgments. All six persons at 
stage 4 or higher were categorized by moral type B in this 
study. 
Marriage, per se, is usually seen as an institution, 
static and unchanging, instead of a dynamic changing process 
in which two persons share their lives and create a mutually 
meaningful, satisfying climate together. The difficulty in 
creating such an environment could be termed marital 
conflict. 
Therapists often see couples for marital therapy who 
claim not to be able to communicate, or if communicating, 
not to be understood. "We don't communicate" or " He/she 
doesn't understand" are often used cliches and are main 
presenting complaints of couples seeking therapy. Could it 
be that these couples are really operating from dissimilar 
stages of moral reasoning and the difficulty in 
communicating or understanding springs from different 
underlying processes (dissimilar stages) for arriving at 
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decisions? 
Conflicting rights, competing claims, and the 
responsibility incurred from these undergird a typical 
marital relationship. Every conflict could be broken down 
into elements of fairness, equity, justice, caring and 
responsibility. How an individual deals with handling such 
conflicts is probably dependent upon the structures of 
decision-making developed over time. As Gilligan's (1982) 
research suggested, 
Men and women may speak different languages that they 
assume are the same, using similar words to denote 
disparate experiences of self and social relationships. 
Because these languages share an overlapping moral 
vocabulary, they contain the propensity for systematic 
mistranslation, creating misunderstanding which impedes 
communication and limit the potential for cooperation 
and care in relationships. (p. 173) 
Perhaps it is not the gender that creates the language 
barrier, but instead the dissimilarity in stages that create 
the barrier. 
The process of helping people grow in moral reasoning 
is predicated on four antecedent conditions: (a) the 
capacity for cognitive development; (b) the desire or 
willingness to change; (c) number of opportunities for 
perspective-taking; and (d) belief in the centrality of 
justice (Kohlberg, 1981). Given the theory of 
cognitive/moral development, clinicians could pattern their 
therapeutic interventions around attempting to change the 
partner who is operating on the lower stage to a higher 
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level of justice reasoning. But if they do not have the 
desire or willingness to change, or an understanding that 
thoughts about justice can change over time, or if they 
cannot see the perspective of the other and be empathic, 
they will not or can not grow or change in moral reasoning. 
It is not unusual to see people of more than average 
intelligence who are operating on the exchange stage 
(preconventional level) of moral reasoning. If any one of 
these conditions is not met, then no growth can occur. 
Therefore, if therapists assess a lack of any one of the 
necessary conditions, implying that the client cannot move 
to a higher stage, then it becomes the function of the 
therapist to help the client or family 
by facilitating the transformation of the family 
system. This process includes three major steps. The 
therapist joins the family for client] in a position of 
leadership. He unearths and evaluates the underlying 
structure [assesses the presence of the antecedent 
conditions]. And he creates circumstances that will 
allow for the transformation of this structure [growth 
process]. (Minuchin, 1974, p. Ill) 
As Dienhart (1983) pointed out, causing cognitive 
disequilibrium is ethically correct for therapists, because 
the assumption is that higher stages of moral reasoning are 
more adequate for good human relationships (Kohlberg, 1984). 
Disequilibrium becomes a sufficient condition for moral 
reasoning growth after the four antecedent necessary 
conditions are met. Usually, the distress of the marital 
conflict has precipitated the disequilibrium that occurs 
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when old moral reasoning structures (stages) no longer seem 
adequate for resolving the present moral conflict. Such 
disequilibrium occurs when a wife realizes that taking care 
of others in the role of the "good" woman is really self 
sacrifice. If she realizes that in higher levels of justice 
all people should have equitable treatment, then the old 
moral reasoning of giving up everything for her family 
presents cognitive conflict or disequilibrium. Such a state 
of disequilibrium is necessary for moral reasoning growth. 
"Marriage therapy offers a context where a couple can learn 
alternative ways of behaving while being forced to abandon 
those past procedures which induced distress" (Erickson & 
Hogan, 1981). 
The cognitive/developmental theory of moral reasoning 
is offered as a paradigm for explaining some of the 
paradoxes presented by the clinical population. If one of 
the presenting problems, as assessed by the therapist, is a 
dissimilarity of partners in stages of justice reasoning or 
responsibility reasoning, then, the person operating on the 
lower stage may appear to be the "innocent party" if they do 
not feel the disequilibrium produced by the stress of the 
conflict. A typical comment of the "innocent party" would 
be "I thought everything was great. I don't have any 
complaints." The person operating on the higher stage may 
appear as the distressed partner because they may now feel 
an injustice is present that was not present before his/her 
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growth to a new level. Actually both partners need to be 
part of the change process if the marital relationship in 
jeopardy is going to grow, since both partners impact on the 
relationship. 
After assessing the cognitive capacities of the 
clients, the therapist, using antecedent conditions for 
change as a framework, can offer intervention at the points 
of (a) willingness to change, (b) number of opportunities 
for role-taking or (c) belief in the centrality of justice. 
As Minuchin (1974) suggested, 
Patients move for three reasons. First, they are 
challenged in their perception of their reality. 
Second, they are given alternative possibilities that 
make sense to them. And third, once they have tried 
out the alternative transactional patterns, new 
relationships appear that are self-reinforcing. 
(p.119) 
Or in other words, clients are challenged as to their 
willingness to do things differently or in their belief of 
the fairness of what they are doing, and then, they are 
presented opportunities within the present relationship for 
role-taking that are different. Partners, if in fulfilling 
the antecedent condition of willingness to change, agree to 
do things differently and support each other in the process, 
will have a chance to improve the relationship to the point 
that it will become reinforcing for both partners. Persons 
do not develop in the same stage across all areas at the 
same time, because the four antecedent conditions are 
dependent upon an individual's personal experiences. Piaget 
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(1965) called this decalage, an uneven development. 
How does a therapist assess clients' moral reasoning 
stages? Therapists constantly assess clients while the 
interview is in progress. A therapist trained in the moral 
stage structure and criterion judgments for these stages can 
make assessments of the stages either in the general 
interview or can use vignettes or moral dilemmas and can ask 
the clients how they would respond. A typical question 
would be, "What if you were the person involved, what would 
you do in this situation?" The responses could then be 
judged as to their stage in moral reasoning. 
This research adds to the literature on the explanation 
of enduring relationships by showing that justice reasoning 
stages are associated with both commitment and happiness in 
long term marriages. In the pilot study a retrospective 
interview of how relationships change over the lifetime of 
the marriage showed that partners who do have long-term 
marriages both developed in moral reasoning stages. 
Sometimes they developed at the same rate. At other times 
one moved ahead of the other. So long as one caught up with 
the other, the marriage continued to have a moderate level 
of happiness and commitment. This is what O'Neill and 
O'Neill (1972) were probably referring to in their 
description of the open marriage which was dependent on the 
acceptance of irregular growth as long as both eventually 
continue to grow. The old cliche that one spouse outgrew 
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the other gains more support. 
Recommendations 
This research study provides some empirical evidence 
that showed that partners in committed and happy marriages 
do indeed have similar levels of justice reasoning but not 
responsibility reasoning. The concept of responsibility 
reasoning needs to be reexamined, not only for its meaning, 
but for its measurement. To further strengthen these 
empirical findings, a replication of this study with a 
larger, random sample of non-clinical couples would enhance 
the validity of the findings. This would also enable one to 
develop more sensitive parameters in ascertaining the levels 
of responsibility reasoning. 
A study of a clinical population would offer new 
insights into the process of marital conflict. The use of 
an objective form, such as the Ethical Reasoning Inventory 
(Page & Bode, 1980) or the Sociomoral Reflection Objective 
Measure (Gibbs, Arnold, Morgan, Schwartz, Gavaghan, & 
Tappan, 1984) would be a more efficient use of time than 
using the hypothetical dilemmas with the transcribing and 
scoring. A similar instrument could be developed for 
responsibility reasoning dilemmas that would also be time 
efficient and still yield useful data. 
Further studies concerning how moral reasoning 
orientations impact on couples would be of interest to 
researcher-therapist-educator since all three positions 
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impact on a community. Since the family is conceptualized 
as the building block of society, any endeavor that improves 
family life has the potential to improve community and 
societal life. It is an ethical responsibility of the 
researcher-educator-therapist to validate research hunches 
through empirical research, to share this learning with 
others, and to assist persons in becoming more than they are 
presently. Only in this way will these three areas converge 
to form a cohesive aggregate and contribute to our society. 
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Letter to Community Leaders 
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FAMILY RESEARCH CENTER 
Department of Child Development and Family Relations 
University of North Carolina 
Greensboro, NC 27412 
AAUW 
Dr. 
Salisbury, NC 28144 
Dear 
I am contacting you and other presidents of civic 
organizations in Salisbury and Rowan county about possible 
participants in a research project I will soon be 
conducting. I am a doctoral candidate in the Department of 
Child Development and Family Relations, UNCG. 
The purpose of this project will be to examine long 
term marriages in the areas of commitment and happiness, and 
to explore the process of how persons reason about these 
areas. In order to gather information about these areas, 
persons will be asked about commitment and perceptions of 
happiness Persons will also be asked to resolve 
hypothetical and real-life dilemmas and give the reasons why 
certain responses were chosen. 
I am asking you if you will identify three couples in 
your organization who have been in their first marriage 15-
40 years, have children either at home or away, are middle 
class or above and appear to be at least moderately 
satisfied with their marriage. Please send me their names, 
addresses and telephone numbers (home and business) on the 
enclosed postcard by March 1. 
After I receive the names from you, I will contact the 
couples asking them to participate in the research project, 
and your part will be over. The Human Subjects Committee at 
UNCG has approved this project, and each couple will be 
asked to sign an informed consent form. 
As with all research done at the University, total 
confidentiality and anonymity will be observed. Responses 
from the couples chosen will be grouped and analyzed 
together so that no connection could ever be made between 
the couples and their responses. Because only a small 
number of couples will be chosen for this project, no one 
except the primary researcher will know who has been 
included from the original list of names. 
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We are all concerned about the quality of family 
relations, and it is projects like this one that contribute 
more information into the overall area. The information 
gathered should generate some recommendations for healthier 
family life. 
I very much appreciate your part in helping me identify 
couples to participate in this project. 
Sincerely, 
Ellen P Goodwin 
Doctoral Candidate 
412 Richmond Road 
Salisbury, NC 28144 
cc: Rebecca M Smith, PhD., Adviser 
Professor of Child Development 
and Family Relations, UNCG 
Appendix B 
Letter to Subjects 
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Dr. and Mrs. John Doe June 17, 1987 
Local Address 
Salisbury, NC 28144 
Dear John and Mary, 
I have contacted presidents of civic and professional 
organizations in Salisbury and Rowan county for names of 
persons who might participate in a research project 
sponsored through the UNCG Department of Child Development 
and Family Relations. Your name was furnished as one who 
might be interested. 
The purpose of this project is to examine long term 
marriages in the areas of commitment and happiness, and to 
explore the process of how persons reason about these areas. 
In order to gather information about these areas, persons 
will be asked about commitment and perceptions of happiness. 
You will also be asked to resolve hypothetical and real-life 
dilemmas and give the reasons why certain responses were 
chosen. 
If you and your spouse are willing to participate in 
this project, please return the enclosed postcard with some 
times that I may contact you by phone. I will then arrange 
appointments with each of you for the interview. The 
interview will take about one to one and one-half hours to 
complete for each. The interviews can be arranged to be 
following one another. All information is confidential. 
There will be three short questionnaires to complete, 
followed by some questions concerning commitment. You will 
then to be asked to respond to three hypothetical dilemmas 
and four real-life dilemmas. I prefer to tape-record the 
interviews since it will be necessary for me to analyze the 
information at a later date. Persons I have already 
interviewed tell me it was an enjoyable and interesting 
experience. 
As with all research done at the University, total 
confidentiality and anonymity will be observed. Responses 
from the interviews will be grouped and analyzed together so 
that no connection could ever be made between an individual 
and their response. The Human Subjects Committee at UNCG 
has approved this project, and you will be asked to sign an 
informed consent form at the time of the interview. 
I have a personal and professional concern about 
quality family relations, and it is projects like this one 
that contribute more information to the field. I would hope 
that the information gathered will generate some 
recommendations for healthier family life. 
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I am very appreciative of your taking the time to read 
this letter, consider participating in the project, and 
returning the postcard. I hope to hear from you. 
Sincerely, 
Ellen P Goodwin 
Doctoral Candidate 
cc: Rebecca M Smith, PhD., Adviser 
Professor of Child Development 
and Family Relations 
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Appendix C 
Informed Consent Form 
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INFORMED CONSENT 
This research is concerned with examining long term 
marriages in the areas of commitment and happiness, and 
exploring the process of how persons reason about these 
areas. In doing so, persons will be asked about commitment 
and perceptions of happiness. You will also be asked to 
resolve hypothetical and real-life dilemmas and give your 
reasons why you chose certain responses. 
The interview will last approximately one to one and 
one-half hours. You and your partner will both be 
interviewed but separately. Your participation in this 
research project is strictly voluntary. You may refuse to 
answer any question and may withdraw from the interview at 
any time. 
Your individual responses will be held confidential. 
Each participant will be assigned an identification number, 
and this information will be kept in a locked file. 
Certain parts of the interview will be tape-recorded in 
order to look for consistencies in the way each individual 
tells the story. These tapes will be kept in a locked file. 
Real names used on the tapes will be changed before the 
tapes are transcribed on paper. Excerpts from the tapes may 
be published in the final report, but there will be no 
identification of the source. 
All interview material, questionnaires, tapes, and 
transcriptions will be destroyed within twelve months after 
the completion of the project. Your permission to record 
and transcribe your response is requested. 
Thank you for your help in this research. 
1/ have been 
satisfactorily informed by the researcher about the 
procedures, risks, and rights to inquiries and withdrawal to 
the research. I am going to voluntarily participate. 
I would like a copy of the summary of the project: 
Yes No 
Signature of the Interviewer Date 
Appendix D 
Demographic Data Form 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
Name Spouse 
Address City Zip. 
Birthday 
Date Married 
Children/Ages , 
Occcupation 
Highest Educational Level Achieved 
Individual Income: Please check one (1). 
None 
Below $25,000 
$25,100 to $50,000 
Above $50,000 
Appendix E 
Perception of Happiness 
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PERCEPTION OF HAPPINESS 
1. Perception of Happiness: 
The dots on the following line represent different 
degrees of happiness in your relationship. Please 
circle the dot which best describes the degree of 
happiness, all things being considered, of your 
relationship. 
0* 1 2 3 5 4 0 
Extremely Fairly A little Happy Very Extremely Perfect 
Unhappy Unhappy Unhappy Happy Happy 
2. If you had your life to live over, do you think you 
would: 
Marry the same person (3) 
Marry a different person (0) 
Not marry at all (0) 
3. How often have you discussed or seriously considered 
divorce, separating, or terminating your relationship: 
All the time (0) 
Most of the time (1) 
More often than not (2) 
Occasionally (3) 
Rarely (4) 
Never (5) 
* The scores were not included on the questionaire given to 
the subjects. 
Appendix F 
Commitment Statements and Questions 
Please choose one of the following statements that best 
describes the present state of your feelings toward your 
relationship. 
3* I want desperately for my relationship to succeed, and 
would go to almost any length to see that it does. 
5 I want very much for my relationship' to succeed, and 
will do all I can to see that it does. 
4 I want very much for my relationship to succeed, and 
will do mv fair share to see that it does. 
2 It would be nice if my relationship succeeded, but I 
can't do much more than I am doing now to help it 
succeed. 
1 It would be nice if my relationship succeeded, but I 
refuse to do any more than I am doing now to keep the 
relationship going. 
0 My relationship can never succeed, and there is no more 
that I can do to keep the relationship going. 
* Scores not included on questionnaires given to subjects. 
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Commitment Questions 
PERSONAL ISSUE AND NORM QUESTIONS 
1. Why did you chose that statement to describe your 
effort/non effort in maintaining the relationship? 
2. What does that mean you will do/not do in maintaining 
the relationship? 
EXPECTATION OF SPOUSE QUESTIONS 
1. Which statement do you think your spouse would chose? 
2. Why would they chose that statement? 
3. What does your spouse do/not do, that would indicate 
they would chose that statement? 
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A Manual for Scoring 
Stages of Valuing Marriage 
I. Marriage is valued as an institution that helps the 
individual meet his/her interpersonal needs and serves 
to protect the individual. 
Criterion Judgment: Marriage is seen as a safe haven, 
a way out of a bad situation. The husband is THE boss, 
and all the wife can do is obey him. This is what she 
chooses to do, because he is big and strong and will 
take care of her. 
NO MATCH EXAMPLES OF THIS STAGE 
II. Marriage is valued as an institution that helps an 
individual by allowing them to take care of others in 
exchange for being taken care of. 
Criterion Judgments: Marriage is seen as a way to take 
care of someone else in exchange for them taking care 
of the other person. The person is willing to make 
sacrifices for their spouse because that is the way it 
should be. 
Match Examples: 
Wife: We have to make personal sacrifices for 
your spouse and that's just sort of the way it has 
always been. 
Husband: In believing in commitments, I will just 
see that we will succeed in our marriage. 
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III. Marriage is valued as an institution that enables the 
individual to fulfil their obligation to take care of 
their spouse. One's value is based on the ability to 
care for and protect others. 
Criterion Judgement: Marriage is seen as a responsible 
act of mature adults. It is valued within itself as a 
status provider. It enables one to take care of others 
and be taken care of. The "rules" of marriage are set 
by societal expectations. 
Match Examples: 
Wife: I would do anything in the world for him 
because he has done everything in the world for 
me. 
Husband: I'm a more satisfied person than (my 
spouse). She is searching more for 
fulfillment...Work together, do my part to 
maintain the marriage. 
III/IV. Marriage is valued as an institution because of a 
sense of shared expectations that each will care 
for the other because each is important and 
valuable. There is a self-chosen responsibility 
to care for self and others. 
Criterion Judgment; Marriage is an arena where 
one is able to show caring and affection for a 
spouse because they are important as an 
individual. Yet, one is able to care for others 
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only as they develop a sense of caring for self. 
This is the beginning of truly valuing a mate 
because of one's ability to be responsible for 
one's self. 
Match Examples; 
Female: Through the years, I have felt that I 
probably did more than my fair share. I am 
starting to concentrate more on me now as a 
person....I am not trying to change anything, only 
asking for room for me to be an individual, not 
just (husband's) wife. It took me a while to get 
there, that is not always an easy thing to do. 
Husband: Because I think we are both committed to 
the relationship, but it is a two-way street. I 
will go the extra mile to compromise, to discuss 
issues. 
IV. Marriage is valued as an institution because it is 
conceived of as based on cooperation and agreement 
between two equal agents. Marriage is seen as an arena 
for maximizing and promotion individual rights within 
a context of relationship with reciprocity and equity 
being maintained in the relationship. 
Criterion Judgment: Marriage is a chosen state of 
being with someone because one's life is better with 
them than without them. It is a place for two unique 
individuals to continue to grow within a context of 
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equity and reciprocity. 
Match Examples: 
Wife: I will give, share, take but not at the 
expense of my own personal esteem, or my own 
personal freedom, or my own personal development. 
Husband: We have been willing to sit down and 
talk about things, and define issues and work out 
strategies for moving forward and I will continue 
to do those sorts of things in the future. 
Appendix G 
Justice Reasoning 
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JUSTICE REASONING INTERVIEW 
FORM A 
Dilemma III: In Europe, a woman was near death from a 
special kind of cancer. There was one drug that 
the doctors thought might save her. It was a 
form of radium that a druggist in the same town 
had recently discovered. The drug was expensive 
to make, but the druggist was charging ten times 
what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for 
the radium and charged $4,000 for a small dose of 
the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went 
to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried 
every legal means, but he could only get together 
about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He 
told the druggist that his wife was dying, and 
asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. 
But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug 
and I'm going to make money from it." So having 
tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and 
considers breaking into the man's store to steal 
the drug for his wife. 
1. Should Heinz steal the drug? 
la. Why or why not? 
*2. Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the 
drug? 
*2a. Why is it right or wrong? 
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*3. Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the 
drug? 
*3a. Why or why not? 
4. [If subject originally favors stealing, ask:] 
If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal 
the drug for her. 
4. [If subject originally favors not stealing, ask:] 
Does it make a difference whether or not he loves 
his wife? 
4a. Why or why not? 
5. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a 
stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the 
stranger? 
5a. Why or why not? 
*6. [If subject favors stealing the drug for a 
stranger, ask:] Suppose it's a pet animal he 
loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal? 
*6a. Why or why not? 
7. Is it important for people to do everything they 
can to save another's life? 
7a. Why or why not? 
*8. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does 
that make it morally wrong? 
*8a. Why or why not? 
9. In general, should people try to do everything 
they can to obey the law? 
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9a. Why or why not? 
9b. How does this apply to what Heinz should do? 
*10. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you 
say is the most responsible thing for Heinz to do? 
*10a. Why? 
Dilemma III':Heinz did break into the store. He stole the 
drug and gave it to his wife. Ijn the newspapers the 
next day, there was an account of the robbery. Mr. 
Brown, a police officer who knew Heinz, read the 
account. He remembered seeing Heinz running away from 
the store and realized that it was Heinz who stole the 
drug. Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that 
Heinz was the robber. 
*1. Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealing? 
*la. Why or why not? 
*2. Suppose Officer Brown were a close friend of 
Heinz, should he then report him? 
*2a. Why or why not? 
Dilemma III': Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was 
arrested and brought to court. A jury was selected. 
The jury's job is to find whether a person is innocent 
or guilty of committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz 
guilty. It is up to the judge to determine the 
sentence. 
3. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence, or 
should he suspend the sentence and let Heinz go 
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free? 
3a. Why is that best? 
4. Thinking in terms of society, should people who 
break the law be punished? 
4a. Why or why not? 
4b. How does this apply to how the judge should 
decide? 
5. Heinz was doing what his conscience told him when 
he stole the drug. Should a lawbreaker be 
punished if he is acting out of conscience? 
5a. Why or why not? 
To elicit moral type 
*6. Thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say 
is the most responsible thing for the judge to do. 
*6a. Why? 
Dilemma I: Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go 
to camp very much. His father promised him he could 
go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe 
worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $100 it 
cost to do to camp and a little more besides. But just 
before camp was going to start, his father changed his 
mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special 
fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money 
it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he 
had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to 
give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to give 
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his father the money. 
1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? 
la. Why or why not? 
To elicit the moral type (Questions 2 and 3) 
*2. Does the father have the right to tell Joe to give 
him the money? 
*2a. Why or why not? 
*3. Does giving the money have anything to do with 
being a good son? 
*3a. Why or why not? 
*4. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself 
important in this situation? 
*4a. Why or why not? 
5. The father promised Joe he could go to camp if he 
earned the money. Is the fact that the father 
promised the most important thing in the 
situation? 
5a. Why or why not? 
6. In general, why should a promise be kept? 
7. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you 
don't know well and probably won't see again? 
7a. Why or why not? 
8. What do you think is the most important thing a 
father should be concerned about in his 
relationship to his son? 
8a. Why is that the most important thing? 
101 
9. In general, what should be the authority of a 
father over his son? 
9a. Why? 
10. What do you think is the most important thing a 
son should be concerned about in his relationship 
to his father? 
10a. Why is that the most important thing? 
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A Sample of Scoring Manual for Stages of 
Justice Reasoning using Hypothetical Dilemmas 
Heinz Dilemma 
Stage 1. Reasons for stealing confuse the intrinsic value 
of a person's life with external status 
characteristics. 
Reasons against stealing or for obeying the law 
refer to simple labeling or breaking the law as 
wrong. 
Stage 2. Reasons for stealing focus on instrumental 
interests, needs, and exchanges, considered from 
the perspective of the individual. 
Reasons against stealing or for obeying the law 
emphasize concrete ownership rights and prudential 
interests. 
Stage 3. Reasons for stealing center on prosocial motives 
and norms and on the expectations of relationships 
valued for their own sake. 
Reasons against stealing or for obeying the law 
relate to normative expectations that people 
should obey the law. 
Stage 4. Reasons for stealing appeals to generalized 
practices, responsibilities, and values, which are 
required or should be upheld by society. 
Reasons against stealing or obeying the law entail 
a rule-utilitarian appreciation of the rights, 
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practices, and institutions functional for the 
social system. 
Stage 5. Reasons for stealing focus on the rights to or 
value of life as the fundamental presupposition to 
socio-legal values. 
Reasons against stealing or for obeying the law is 
based on the assumption that any rational 
individual would appreciate and contract into law 
as necessary for agreement in society and for 
protection of his or her own rights or interests. 
Note: Adapted from Colby and Kohlberg, The measurement of 
moral judgment; Standard issue scoring manuals. Vol., 
II, (1988). 
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STANDARD SCORING SHEET 
DATE: 
INTERVIEW NO./S MMI 
SCORED BV: FOAM A/FORM B (c1rc1« one) 
, (Clrclc Chosen Issue) OIIEMMA III (FORH A) Oft IV (FORM B) 
LIFE (Form A ) or LIFE-QUALITY (Form B) ISSUE I AM (Fonn A) or m/LIFE-PRESERV.(Fonn B) ISSUE 
Q* SJrf/Noni i Elaaant Staga (Subataga/Notai) Q* CI 1 /Hon k llaaant kcaga l6ubatag«/Notaa) 
ISSUE SCORE: ISSUE:SC0RE: 
(Clrcls Choien Issue) OILEHHA III' (FORM A) or IV (FORH B) 
MORALITY * CONSCIENCE ISSUE PUNISHMENT ISSUE 
Q1 J l/Mora t  Elaaant Stage (Subataga/Notai) Q# CJ I/Nora & Elaaant Stag* (Subataga/Notaa) 
\ 
I 
i 
ISSUE SCORE: ISSUE SCORE: 
(Circle Chosen Issue) DILEMMA 1 (FORH A) OR II (FORM B) 
rrwTBirr ksiif AUTHORITY ISSUF 
at J #/Mora k Elaaant StaRe (Subacage/Noce*) Ql CJ I/Nora & Elaaant S t a g e .  ( S u b « )  
ISSUE SCORE: ISSUE SCORE: 
Sunutad 
Valghtlnga 
fro* 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. OVERALL PROTOCOL SCORE 
CLMALJ 
MMSt 
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RELATIONSHIP DILEMMAS 
Dilemma 1. 
Alan and Sue have been happily married for 20 years. 
Alan is a successful lawyer, and Sue is the Executive 
Director of the Community Art Council, a position that 
carries much responsibility and status in the 
community. With their combined income, they fall in 
the upper-middle class. Alan has been offered a 
political job 500 miles away from where they live with 
an income equal to both of their incomes. Alan wants 
to take the job and move with his family to the larger 
town. 
COMMITMENT DILEMMA—Reciprocity versus cooperation 
1. What should Alan do? 
la. Why or why not? 
2. Is Alan responsible to anyone other than himself? 
2a. Why or why not? 
3. If Sue does not want to move (different from Alan's 
position), should that make a difference to Alan? 
3a. Why or why not? 
4. Which is more important, loyalty to self or loyalty to 
spouse? 
4a. Why or why not? 
5. Who has the final decisions? 
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Mary has a friend receiving cancer therapy every 
Wednesday at noon at a hospital 60 miles away. She 
normally has a driver but on this particular day, her 
driver is sick, and her back-up driver is out-of-town. 
Mary's friend calls on Tuesday and asks Mary to take 
her for her therapy. Mary agrees and they arrange to 
leave at 10:am. Ben, Mary's husband, calls at 9:30am 
on Wed. morning to say that the big boss is in town for 
the day and wants Mary to join them for an important 
luncheon meeting that has to do with Ben's future with 
the company. 
CARING DILEMMA—Relationship versus wife role 
obligation 
1. What should Mary do? 
la. Why or why not? 
2. Does Ben have the right to tell Mary she has to meet 
with them? 
2a. Why or why not? 
3. Is an agreement with a friend as important as a 
request from a spouse? 
3a. Why or why not? 
4. Would you say that Mary "promised" her friend she would 
do something? 
4a. Why is an agreement like/not like a promise? 
5. What do promises have to do with relationships? 
Dilemma 3. 
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Carolyn worked at a secretarial job during the years 
that David attended graduate school. During that time, 
they had two children. When David became established 
in his professional career, Carolyn became interested 
in finishing her undergraduate degree and getting a 
Master's. She asked David to arrange his work schedule 
(which was possible) so that he would be home when the 
children came home from school. She suggested that he 
could use that time to catch up on book work. 
EQUITY AND CUMMULATIVE JUSTICE DILEMMA 
1. What should David do? 
la. Why or why not? 
2. Does Carolyn's previous behavior (working while David 
was in school) have any thing to do with this 
situation? 
2a. Why or why not? 
3. Does Carolyn's wanting to go to school place an 
obligation on David? 
3a. Why or why not? 
4. Is it fair for Carolyn to want to return to school? 
4a. Why or why not? 
Dilemma 4. 
Linda and Jim were both involved in professional 
careers. They had been married twelve years, and their 
two children were in elementary school. Linda had 
taken time off with each pregnancy, but, since she had 
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returned to work quickly, had not lost seniority in 
her position. Shortly after her 39th birthday, Linda 
discovered that she had a contraceptive failure and she 
was pregnant. Neither Jim nor she had planned on more 
children. Jim was really excited. 
BALANCING PERSPECTIVES DILEMMA 
1. What should Linda do? 
la. Why or why not? 
2. In this case, should Linda consider her own feelings 
more that Jim's feelings or consider Jim's feelings 
more than her own? 
2a. Why or why not? 
3. Should this be a mutual or unilateral decision? 
3a. Why or why not? 
4. If the persons take a different stance on the dilemma, 
who should have the final word? 
4a. Why? 
A Scoring Manual for Stages of 
Responsibility Judgments 
using Real-Life Dilemmas 
STAGE 1 Responsibility and obligation are seen as being the 
same. The person feels compelled to fulfill the 
commands and rules of the parent figure or spouse. 
External approval dictates behavior. 
Criterion Judgment: The person involved in the 
decision-making has only a responsibility to him/her 
self and external approval is a major basis for 
arriving at a decision. 
Match Examples; NO MATCH EXAMPLES PRESENTED 
STAGE 2 Responsibility is differentiated from obligation 
from this stage onward. The person is responsible 
only to and for himself or herself and his or her 
welfare, property, and goals. 
Criterion Judgment: The person involved in the 
decision-making should discuss with their spouse, but 
the actual decision is theirs' alone to make. 
Rules and agreements are made according to whether the 
rules and agreements will help or be instrumental to 
that person. 
Match Examples: 
Dilemma #2. "She should get out of the agreement to 
meet with her husband and boss." 
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Dilemma #3. "She shouldn't ask him to help." 
STAGE 2/3 There is a recognition that everyone is 
responsible to and for themselves, their welfare, 
property, and goals. Persons who are irresponsible or 
careless lose some of the right to have themselves, 
their welfare, and so on, respected. For example, 
being a poor housekeeper or a poor earner mitigatesthe 
right to have one's property respected as well as 
justifying a lessened concern for the person's welfare. 
Connection and attachment begin to become issues at 
this transitional stage. 
Criterion Judgment: The person involved in the 
decision-making should discuss this with their 
spouse and find out what the concerns are, but the 
final decision in the dilemma in HIS/HERS alone. 
Match Examples: 
Dilemma #2. "Don't let someone down, then they won't 
help you." "This was an agreement, not a promise." 
Dilemma #3. "He should help but only if HE wants 
to." 
Dilemma #4. "I know I should talk to my husband, but I 
can't." "It is MY responsibility." 
STAGE 3 Responsibility for the self is to do the "good" 
thing, to live up to generally known and accepted 
standards of a "good person." Responsibility to 
others is limited to those with whom one has a 
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personal relationship (like a marital relationship) and 
is defined as meeting their needs or promoting their 
welfare. Self-sacrifice becomes the norm of goodness, 
and when responsibility conflicts, the self becomes 
the sacrificed victim. 
Criterion Judgment: The spouse involved in the 
decision-making should discuss this with their spouse, 
but since roles are set by society, the wife becomes 
the compromiser and makes the adjustments to her life, 
while the husband's main responsibility is to be the 
bread-winner. Each is concerned with doing the "right" 
thing since that becomes the "good" decision. 
Match Examples: 
Dilemma #1. "The wife has to compromise." 
Dilemma #2. "Her friend needs her more." 
Dilemma #3. "He needs to be unselfish." "She 
helped him, she deserves a little consideration now." 
Dilemma #4. "I want to say she should be 
responsible to self, but I can't." "She decides she 
would be a bad person if she had an abortion." 
STAGE 3/4 Responsibility is seen more as a process for 
maintaining and enhancing feelings of closeness and 
affection in personal relationships, a reconsideration 
of the relationship between self and others. There is 
an infant awareness of the beginning shift from 
approval of others to an inner sense of judgment for 
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what is honest and real. Being irresponsible is 
defined as "hurting the other's feelings" within a 
relationship andis considered a valid basis for a 
lessened concern of the other's welfare if one's 
feelings have been hurt. 
Criterion Judgment; The spouses know that the 
relationship is maintained by both being willing to be 
flexible and to negotiate. Decisions are reflective of 
the spouse's stand. There is beginning awareness of an 
inner voice in determining one's position, yet other's 
opinions are still important. 
Match Examples: 
Dilemma #1. "Marriage is a two-sided agreement." 
"They are responsible to each other." 
Dilemma #2. "Friendships are based on trust; 
relationships grow when you can be relied upon or 
can rely on the other person." 
Dilemma #3. "There should be give and take in a 
marital relationship." "Carolyn has a need and he 
should help Carolyn with her need." 
Dilemma #4. "Jim is half of the unborn. He has to 
have input." 
STAGE 4 Responsibility is seen as a mutually binding set of 
feelings and agreements among people in relationships 
or marriages. Being responsible for the self means one 
must act out of dependability, trustworthiness, and 
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loyalty regardless of the day-to-day fluctuation of 
feelings among people. Equity and reciprocity are key 
ingredients in maintaining the relationship. 
Responsibility becomes a self-chosen ethic that enables 
one to reconstruct the dilemma in new terms knowing 
that choices made becomes one's responsibility. A 
transformed understanding of self allows for assertion 
of moral equality between self and others. 
Irresponsibility on the part of a partner or group does 
not mitigate concern for their welfare or rights by 
their spouse. 
Criterion Judgment: The decision is regarded as a 
mutual decision, and each spouse has equal input into 
the process of deciding. They both are willing to 
negotiate to the best possible outcome. They strive 
for maximum joint profit knowing that their ultimate 
decision lies with the self after all other 
possibilities have been considered. At times, the 
compromises appear to be like Stage 3, but the 
difference is the self-chosen decision in response to a 
caring atmosphere, not a societally dictated behavior. 
Match Examples: 
Dilemma #1. "You mean more to me than the job. We 
will decide together." 
Dilemma #2. "Agreement is more important than a 
request. It's a commitment." "Once you promise, 
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you have to carry through because you would let 
yourself down as well as the other person." [CJ 33-
Contract] 
Dilemma #3. "They have a total relationship. He 
wants to do it for her." "He's doing it because he 
wants to. It is not an obligation." "There is no 
obligation from her previous behavior. That was then. 
This is now." 
Dilemma #4. "Wife's decision ultimately because 
she's the one that will carry the pregnancy and the 
childcare, probably. Husband should be accepting of 
her decision." 
Appendix J 
Comparison of Stages of Justice Reasoning, 
The Ethic of Responsibility, and 
Responsibility Reasoning 
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Comparison of the Stages of Justice Reasoning (Kohlberg). 
Ethic of Responsibility (Gilligan). and Responsibility 
Reasoning (Higgins) 
Kohlberg(1981) Gilliganf1977) Higglns(1984) 
LEVEL I PRECONVENTIONAL MORALITY 
Stage 1 Heteronomous Level I Stage 1 
Morality Individual 
Survival 
Stage 2 Instrumental Level I/II Stage 2 
Morality From Selfishness Stage 2/3 
to Responsibility 
LEVEL II CONVENTIONAL MORALITY 
Stage 3 Interpersonal Level II Stage 3 
Normative Goodness as 
Morality Self-Sacrifice 
Stage 4 Social System Level II/III Stage 3/4 
Morality From Goodness 
to Truth 
LEVEL III POST-CONVENTIONAL MORALITY 
Stage 5 Human Rights Level III Stage 4 
and Social The Ethic 
Welfare of Responsi-
Morality bility 
Stage 6 Universal, 
Reversible, 
and Prescriptive 
General Ethical 
Principles 
Appendix K 
Moral Type Scoring Sheet 
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MORAL TYPE SCORING SHEET 
OATf 
SCGAEO IY. 
SUBJECT. 
TIME 
CRITERIA 
Form A 
111 111' 
for* B 
jv 111 LI 
fona C 
VH'  VI I  
Choice 
Hierarchy 
Warms ica lness 
Pryscr ip^")v>ty 
U n i v e r s a l  1 t y  
F reedum 
Mutual Respect 
Reversibl1Ity 
Construe tivl so 
0ILLMKA SCORE: 
FORK SC08£: 
Appendix L 
Numerical Values of Data Used in 
Statistical Analysis 
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Numerical Values of Data Used in Statistical Analysis 
Couple Happiness Co«»it«ent 
Justice Score (MS) 
Horal Type Valuing Harriaoe 
Responsibility (RMS) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Hife Husband Wife Husband Uife(HHS) Husband(HHS) Wife Husband Wife(RMS) Husband Wife Husband 
11 13 .5 5 3/4(368) 3/4(350) A A 3(285) 2/3(266) 
8 8 3 3 3/4(333) 3/4(327) B A 3(303) 2/3(254) 
8 12 5 3 3(269) 4(378) A B 3/4(330) 4(393) 
12 12 5 5 2/3(289) 2/3(282) B A 3(306) 2/3(267) 
8 11 5 4 4(397) 5(487) B B 3/4(341) 3/4(379) 
12 12 5 5 3(323) 3/4(360) B A 3(300) 3/4(337) 
12 11 5 5 3(323) 3/4(363) A A 3(317) 2/3(270) 
12 12 5 5 3(307) 3/4(333) A B 3(302) 3(311) 
12 11 5 5 4/5(446) 4/5(445) B „ B 4(400) 4(392) 
12 12 5 3 3/4(367) 4(402) A B 3/4(342) 3/4(341) 
12 12 5 3 3(303) 3(322) A A 3(293) 3/4(336) 
11 10 5 5 3/4(375) 3/4(371) B B 3(292) 3/4(324) 
12 12 4 5 3/4(347) 3/4(360) A A 3/4(333) 3/4(326) 
12 8 3 3 3(292) 3(306) B A 2/3(259) 3(303) 
12 12 5 5 3(315) 3/4(328) B A 3/4(326) 3(305) 
3(300) 3(300) 
2(200) 2(200) 
4(400) 3(300) 
2(200) 2(200) 
4(400) 3(300) 
3/4(350) 3(300) 
3(300) 3(300) 
3(300) 3(300) 
4(400) 4(400) 
4(400) 3(300) 
3(300) 3(300) 
3(300) 3(300) 
3(300) 2(200) 
2(200 2(200) 
3/4(350) 2(200) 
Total 166 168 70 64 47S4 5420 7 A 9 A 4729 4804 4700 4100 
Mean 11.1 11.2 4.7 4.3 317 361 8 B 6B 315 320 313 273 
